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Proposition 8: Origins and Impact--A
Public Defender's Perspective

Jeff Brown*

INTRODUCTION

In June, 1982 California voters enacted the Victims' Bill of
Rights, Proposition 8.' An initiative placed on the ballot through
a petition drive by various anti-crime groups, prosecutors, and
conservative politicians, Proposition 8 contained constitutional and
statutory provisions designed to reverse many decisions of the
California courts which had expanded the rights of the accused.
Proposition 8 also contained provisions which gave victims and
their family members the right to be heard at sentencing;2 it also
declared a right to safe schools3 and a right to restitution for the
victims of crimes.4
During the public debate on Proposition 8, both proponents and
opponents spoke of the possibility of its passage in almost
millennial terms. To its backers, Proposition 8 was seen as the last
chance to restore balance in a criminal justice system skewed in

*

B.A., University of California; J.D., San Francisco Law School; Public Defender of San

Francisco, 1979-Present; Co-Chair, Citizens for Responsible Law Enforcement, a group formed to
oppose Proposition 8. The author would like to thank Cerina P. Santos, Robin Levine, and Peter G.
Hanson for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Victims Bill of Rights, Initiative Measure Proposition 8 (approved June 8,1982) (codified
at CAL. CONS?, art. I, §§ 12, 28; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25, 667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043 (West Supp.
1992); CAL. WETS. & INST. CODE §§ 1732.5, 1767, 6331 (West Supp. 1992)).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West Supp. 1992) (providing for victim's statements at
sentencing and parol proceedings). See also CAL. Wmn2. & INsT. CODE § 1767 (West 1984)

(providing for victim's statements in juvenile sentencing proceedings).
3. CAL CONST. art. I, § 28(c).
4. Id. § 28(b).
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favor of the accused.' According to the initiative's proponents,
California courts had transformed the trial process from a search
for truth to a search for technical perfection,6 while a liberaldominated legislature had killed almost every bill designed to
correct the courts' errors. The net result was that law enforcement
was being prevented from removing dangerous criminals from
society!
Conversely, opponents of Proposition 8 saw the initiative as
demolishing an edifice of justice which had carefully been
established by California courts confronted with injustices and
police abuse.' According to its opponents, if Proposition 8 passed
California would revert to those minimal standards of justice that
existed decades before when police, prosecutors, and result-oriented
judges ran rough-shod over the rights of the accused.'"

5. See, e.g., Wright, Your Last Chance, San Francisco Examiner, May 16, 1982, § B at 9,
col. 1 ("Unless you are a criminal, you should go to the polls next month and vote for Proposition
8, the Victims' Bill of Rights. This may be your last chance to stop the California Supreme Court
from pushing justice off the cliff").
6. See Memorandum from Michael D. Bradbury, District Attorney, County of Ventura, to
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of State of California, (February 24, 1981) at 11 (copy
on file at Pacific Law Journal).In this memorandum Mr. Bradbury set forth examples of decisions
by the Supreme Court, which he believed hampered valid prosecutions. Id. at 2-4. Many of these
examples would later be the basis of arguments for Proposition 8 by him and others.
7.
See Urgent Bulletin from George Nicholson (April, 1982) at 2 (copy on file at PacficLaw
Journal).Mr. Nicholson's "Urgent Bulletin" encouraging people to work for Proposition 8's passage
was written under the masthead of "George Nicholson for Attorney General-The Heavyweight
Crime Fighter." Id.at 1. See also Gann, Arguments in Favor of Proposition 8, in CAL. BALLOT
PAMPHLET 35 (June 8, 1982) (setting forth the rebuttal argument of Paul Gann, quoting
Assemblywoman Carol Hallett as saying -[a] generation of victims have been ignored by our
Legislature, thanks to Assembly Criminal Justice Committee").
8. See Gann, Arguments in Favor of Proposition8, in CAL. BALLOT PAMPH.ET, supra note
7, at 35 (rebuttal argument of Paul Gann, stating that victims of crime in California are also "victims
of our criminal justice system-the liberal reformers, lenient judges and behavior modification dogoodes who release hardened criminals again and again to victimize the innocent").
9. See Letter from Jeff Brown (Californians for Responsible Law Enforcement) to various
California lawyers soliciting contributions (Spring, 1982) (copy on file at PacificLaw Journal)(citing
some of the abuses which the opponents felt Proposition 8 would allow). See also Letter from Shirley
Hufstedler, Bernard Jefferson, and Robert S.Thompson to California lawyers (April 26, 1982) (copy
on file at Pacific Law Journal) ("Proposition 8 is a bold effort to dismantle the law of evidence in
criminal trials, to resurrect the legal test for insanity ...to destroy the constitutional right to bail,
and to impair many principles essential to a fair and impartial criminal trial. Proposition 8 is a
wholesale assault on procedural and substantive law painstakingly developed over decades").
10. See Letter from Shirley Hufstedler, supra note 9 (expressing these concerns).
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The origins of Proposition 8 remain obscure to all but its
drafters. The primary group formed to support it was the Citizens'
Committee to Stop Crime which, with the help of conservative tax
crusader Paul Gann, secured 665,000 signatures in support of
Proposition 8 from August 1, 1981 to January 1, 1982. One of
Proposition 8's authors, George Nicholson, who at that time was a
Senior Assistant Attorney General who had also served as
Executive Director of the California District Attorneys Association,
used Proposition 8 as a platform in his primary race for the
Republican nomination for Attorney General." Nicholson, along
with Republicans in the Legislature, used Proposition 8 as an
opportunity to attack then Chief Justice Rose Bird, the Democratic
controlled Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice (referred to as
"the graveyard of criminal justice legislation"), and the
Committee's chairman, Assemblyman Terry Goggin12
The opposition consisted of a small group of defense attorneys,
members of the staff of the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee,
bar association leaders and civil libertarians. 3 Opposition
members successfully enlisted the active opposition of two county
district attorneys and several leaders of the victims'-rights
movement, including Candy Lightner, the founder of Mothers
Against Drunk Driving. 4 The opposition's tactic was to stress the

11. See Urgent Bulletin from George Nicholson, supra note 7.
12. See idA at 1-2. The Bulletin stated:
[Proposition 8] must win by a substantial margin if the VICTIMS' BILL OF RIGHTS is
to endure. This is because Chief Justice Bird and a majority of the California Supreme
Court have already expressed great hostility to [it].... [Terry] Goggin has a long anti-law
enforcement bias, as does the *Graveyard of Criminal Justice Legislation,* the committee
he chairs.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also C. Wright, In Defense of the Victims of Crime,An Analysis of
Proposition8, the CriminalJustice Initiative,Report to Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice 1-3,
48 (March 24, 1982) [hereinafter, In Defense of ictims] (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal)
(repeating many of Mr. Nicholson's criticisms of the California Supreme Court and Mr. Goggin).
13. See Letter from Jeff Brown, supranote 9 (masthead listing of organization's membership).
14. Press Release, Californians for Responsible Law Enforcement, Candy Lightner,Founder
of MothersAgainst Drunk Driving (MADD), Opposes Proposition 8, (June 1, 1982) (copy on file at
Pacific Law Journal).
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initiative's counter-effectiveness and costliness.15 The opposition
claimed that the initiative would be exploited by defense
attorneys,16 that its plea bargain ban would make accomplice
testimony impossible,17 or that it would entail huge new costs in
court procedures and in jail and prison construction. 8 Opposition
members also highlighted the initiative's drafting problems and
ambiguities, largely to illustrate that Proposition 8 would cause
confusion in the courts.19
With very limited money, the opponents worked newspaper
editorial boards, labor unions, and even police associations; filled
the op-ed columns, and took advantage of any free radio time.20
Though not ultimately successful, the opponents kept the margin of
victory to considerably less than had been predicted.21
Proposition 8 became effective the day after the election,
resulting in a scurry of activity by district attorneys, public
defenders, and judges trying to acquaint themselves with its wideranging provisions.22 Many of these provisions affected the
criminal courts' daily routines. For example, Proposition 8

15. See Jost, Victims of Proposition8, LA. Daily J., June 12, 1982, at 3, col. 5-6 ("With a
budget of $45,000, the opposition... emphasized a simplistic message that it was confusing, would
cost up to $1 billion or more, and would not put a single additional policeman on the streets").
16. See Gilbert, Roden & Goggin, Argument Against Proposition 8, in CAL. BALLOT
PA emPm., supranote 7, at 35 (stating that Proposition 8 "frees defense lawyers to smear police who
testify in court").
17. See id. (stating that Proposition 8 would make "convicting people like the 'Freeway
Killer' nearly impossible").
18. See id. (arguing that Proposition 8 "requires millions of dollars in new court procedures-but no money to pay for them").
19. See Letter from Chairman Terry Goggin to Hon. Willie Brown, printed in Assembly
Committee on Criminal Justice, Analysis of Proposition 8: The Criminal Justice Initiative,
[hereinafter, Analysis ofProposition 8], March 24, 1982, 1-2 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal)
("Of particular concern to policy makers is the likelihood that, if enacted, Proposition 8 will ...
[s]wamp appellate courts with protracted appeals over the meaning of the Initiative. The courts will
have to resolve the many ambiguities and contradictions of the measure...").
20. Interview with Ross Clark, Former Chief Consultant, Assembly Committee on Criminal
Justice (May 13, 1991) (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal).
21. See Jost, supra note 15 (reporting that 56.4% of the voters voted in favor of Proposition
8, and 43.6% were opposed).
22. See Finefrock, Victims" Rights Law Sends Courts into PoliticalThicket, San Francisco
Examiner, June 9, 1982, § B, at 1, col. 5-6 [hereinafter PoliticalThicket].
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ostensibly had thrown out bail schedules 23 and outlawed plea
bargaining in various types of cases; 24 changed the insanity
standard and abolished diminished capacity defenses; 25 and
specified new enhancements for certain felony defendants
previously convicted of serious felonies.26 Additionally,
Proposition 8 appeared to nullify California decisional law on
searches and confessions, 27 causing judges to ask what weight
they must give to existing precedent.
For all the uncertainty, things managed to settle down within a
few months.28 On their own, most prosecutors accepted the
concept that the initiative's provisions did not change cases already
in court.29 For the most part, trial courts continued to be guided
rule
by existing case law until the California Supreme Court could
30
constitutionality.
initiative's
the
to
made
on the challenges
Eventually change came. In September of 1982, the Supreme
Court of California upheld almost all of Proposition 8 against the
various attacks that had been waged against it.3t From then on,
the impact of the initiative's articles on the criminal courts would
be slow, but inexorable.

23.
See Text of Proposed Law, in CAL. BALLOT PAMPHL.T 33 (setting forth the proposed
PublicSafety Bail amendment to article I, section 28(e) of the California Constitution). Proposition
8's controversial and radical bail provision attempted to make the primary goal of bail public safety,
rather than the return of the accused to court. The bail provision ended bail as a matter of right in
non-capital cases. IL Prior to the passage of Proposition 8, release on bail was administered through
court established bail schedules that set a standard bail amount for certain offenses and circumstances.
Analysis of Proposition 8, supra note 19, at 25-26. It was widely thought that Proposition 8's bail
provision abrogated bail schedules because under its terms judges had to determine whether an
arrested person was a threat to public safety, and had to state on the record the reasons for granting
or denying release on bail. Id at 26. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 254-55, 651 P.2d 274,
285, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30,41 (1982) (declaring the bail provision inoperative because an alternative and
superseding bail amendment on the same ballot, Proposition 4, received more votes).
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West Supp. 1992) (enacted by Proposition 8).
25. See i. § 25 (West 1988) (enacted by Proposition 8).
26. See id § 667 (West Supp. 1992) (enacted by Proposition 8).
27. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (enacted by Proposition 8).
28. See Brown, After Doomsday: The First Days Under Proposition 8, San Francisco
Barrister, July-Aug. 1982, at 1, 16-17 [hereinafter After Doomsday].
29. Finefrock, PoliticalThicket, supra note 22, at B7, col. 2.
30. Brown, After Doomsday, supra note 28, at 16.
31. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
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A decade later, one can begin to understand Proposition 8's
significance. All in all, a sea of change occurred in California
criminal jurisprudence. The sheer scope of the wide-ranging
initiative nullified a long-standing body of California law
painstakingly crafted to protect the rights of the accused. Just as
significant, the initiative constituted a breakpoint in the attitude of
32
decision makers--legislators, appellate justices, and trial judges.
After June, 1982, there would be a distinct shift in mood and tone,
a pronounced lessening of solicitude for defendants' rights and a
very real fear of being accused of being soft on crime. In close
cases appellate judges tended to give effect to Proposition 8.
Trial judges meted out stiffer sentences.34 Legislators competed
with one another to carry the agenda of police and district attorney
35
lobbyists.

32. But cf.McCoy & Tllman, ControllingFelony Plea Bargainingin California: The Impact
of the ictims' Bill of Rights (Aug. 1986) (monograph prepared for Criminal Justice Fellowship
Program sponsored by California Department of Justice) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journa).
McCoy and Tillman make the following observation:
Thus, Proposition 8 was not so much a radical reversal of recent trends in criminal justice
as it was a phenomenon that gave public visibility to a submerged trend toward more
punitive 'law and order' legislation in California. While political support for these
measures had been weak in the late 1970's, the tide had shifted by 1980, when even the
most liberal lawmakers began to publicly declare their support for tough anti-crime
measures.
Id at 2. This statement has a strong element of truth. However, Proposition 8 can be likened to the
hurricane that followed a windstorm, driving home the reality that change had come.
33. See, e.g., People v. Sullivan, 234 Cal. App. 3d 56, 61-65, 285 Cal. Rptr. 553, 557-59
(1991) (finding that section 28(d) of article I of the California Constitution [enacted by Proposition
8] allowed admission of evidence obtained from a "speed trap" and thus nullified section 40803 of
the California Vehicle Code, despite reenactment of the Vehicle Code section after Proposition 8);
People v. Prather, 50 Cal. 3d 428, 432-40, 267 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607-13, 787 P.2d 1012, 1014-20
(1990) (interpreting section 28(f) of article I of the California Constitution [enacted by Proposition
8] as abrogating the "double-the-base term limitation" of California Penal Code section 1170.1 (g)
despite the absence of a clear statement to that effect in the initiative or its supporting arguments).
See also discussion Part PV, infra, notes 271-323 and accompanying text (regarding enhancement of
prison terms).
34. This conclusion is based largely on the author's observation as a twenty-year practitioner.
See infra note 321 (discussing problems in validating this conclusion empirically).
35. Interview of Steve White, District Attorney, Sacramento County, and lobbyist for
California District Attomeys Association in 1982 (July 10, 1991) (notes on file at Pacific Law
Journal).
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This Article examines the purposes of the Victims' Bill of
Rights (that is, what the drafters wanted to accomplish)36 and
measures those purposes against the initiative's ultimate impact.
Since Proposition 8 was multi-faceted, this Article necessarily
divides its discussion into specific subject areas.37 Thus, Part I of
this article discusses admissibility of evidence; Part II considers
proof of prior convictions for attacking credibility and proving an
element of the offense charged;39 Part III addresses insanity and
diminished capacity defenses;' Part IV examines sentence
enhancements;41 and Part V discusses plea bargaining. 2 Finally,
Part VI of this Article concludes with the observation that, contrary
to the promises of the Proponents of Proposition 8, limiting the
rights of the accused in criminal proceeding has obviously had little
impact in making California safer for law-abiding citizens.43

36. In discussing the major components of Proposition 8, this Article examines the state of
the law leading up to the initiatives, the drafters' attempt to change it, the debate surrounding the
proposed changes, and the ultimate changes in substantive law and the administration of justice. This
analysis is handicapped by the lack of materials from the drafters themselves-they produced no
Federalist Papers. However, their intentions are, for the most part, clear enough from the changes
they sought and their many analyses and writings. From these sources, we can see which of those
intentions were fulfilled, which were frustrated, and which precipitated an unanticipated outcome.
37. Two important elements of Proposition 8 are not discussed-restitution and victim
statements. Although they were very much part of Proposition 8's appeal, their impact on criminal
prosecution and defense work remains relatively insignificant. Suffice it to say that restitution has
been expanded since Proposition 8 to include a restitutionary assessment against state prisoners. See
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13967.2(a) (West Supp. 1992) (implementing the language of CAL. CoNsT. art.
1, § 28(b), (enacted by Proposition 8). Additionally, restitution fines are awarded to support the
victim indemnity fund. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 13967 (West Supp. 1992). For most defendants,
however, the restitution provisions are viewed as getting "blood out of a turnip." As for victim
statements, the provisions do allow seriously aggrieved people their day in court. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1191.1 (West Supp. 1992) (providing for statements by victims at sentencing and parole
hearings). However, victims rarely take advantage of the opportunity to speak out, and when they do,
the statements have little effect on sentencing outcomes.
Proposition 8 also included a bail provision. See supra note 23 and accompanying text
(discussing bail provision). The bail provision is not discussed in this Article because the provision
never went into effect.
38. See infra notes 44-106 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 107-155 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 156-270 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 271-324 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 325-351 and accompanying text.
43. See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
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I. ADMISSIBILTY OF EViDENCE

For many years before Proposition 8, prosecutors and their
supporters complained that California Supreme Court decisions
limited their ability to present evidence against the accused.'
Prosecutors saw the Supreme Court of California as overlyprotective of defendants' interests, primarily in cases involving
illegal searches, improperly-obtained confessions, and use of prior
convictions for impeachment and sentence enhancement. 5
Although he was not specific, Attorney General George
Deukmejian summarized their feeling in his ballot argument in
favor of Proposition 8:
Crime has increased to an absolutely intolerable level. While criminals

murder, rape, rob and steal, victims must install new locks, bolts, bars
and alarm systems in their houses and businesses. Many buy tear gas
and guns for self-protection. FREE PEOPLE SHOULD NOT HAVE TO

LIVE IN FEAR.
Yet, higher courts of this state have created additional rights for the

criminally accused and placed more restrictions on law enforcement
officers. This proposition
will overcome some of the adverse decisions
46
by our higher courts.
A. Search and Seizure and Confessions
In search and seizure and confession cases, the California
Supreme Court had indeed fashioned protections which exceeded
those mandated by the United States Supreme Court. 47 The

44. See, e.g., Memorandum from Michael D. Bradbury, District Attorney, County of Ventura,
to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of State of California, (February 24, 1981) at 4-5
(copy on file at Pacifc Law Journal).
45. See, e.g., Thompson, Proposition8: The Victims' Bill of Rights, Striking a Balance in
CriminalJustice, Orange County Bar Bulletin (May 1982).
46. DeukmejianArguments in FavorofProposition8, in CAL. B.LLOT PAMPHLIT, supranote
7, at 34 (emphasis in original).
47. See Attorney General's Guide To Proposition 8, printed in Criminal Practice Afier
Proposition8 207 (June 9, 1982) [hereinafterAttorney General's Guide] (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journa) (providing a summary of California cases employing different standards in search and
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California Supreme Court relied on the California Constitution,

specifically on article I, section 24: "Rights guaranteed by this
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. '

41

Where it found no guidance or precedent

on a particular issue from federal cases, or where it felt those cases
gave inadequate protection, the court developed remedies based on

its interpretation of the California constitutional protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures

and against compulsory self-

incrimination." Although the search provision was identical to the
fourth amendment and the self-incrimination provision was similar
to the fifth amendment, the California Supreme Court consistently

was willing to. use the provisions of the California Constitution to
reach contrary and more expansive results from those of federal
courts on much the same issues."1
The California Supreme Court's willingness to go beyond
federal standards was exemplified by the requirement that police
obtain a search warrant before searching the trunk of a car, even if
they had probable cause to believe evidence or contraband was

present.5 2 Under federal law, no such warrant was required.53 In
other search cases, there were differences between state and federal

law regarding what party had standing to object to the introduction
of illegally-seized evidence,5 4 on the suppression of warrants for

seizure and confession cases prior to June, 1982). See also infra notes 52-69 and accompanying text
(comparing California and federal cases on search and seizure and confession issues).
48. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 24. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548-52, 531 P.2d
1099, 1111-15, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 327-31 (1975).
49. CAL. CONST. arL1, § 13.
50. Id. § 15. See Uelman, Fifty CaliforniaSupreme CourtDecisionsWhich Will be Abrogated
by PropositionEight's Elimination of Independent State Groundsfor the Exclusion of Evidence,
CALIF. CONT. ED. BAR, PROGRAm MATauAL 47-65 (July 1982) (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal).
51. See Attorney General'sGuide, supra note 47, at 207-21.
52. Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557,571,547 P.2d 417,426, 128 Cal. Rptr. 641,
650 (1976).
53. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982).
54. Compare Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 153,491 P.2d. 1, 2,98 Cal. Rptr. 649,
650 (1978) (holding that a defendant has standing to object to the introduction of evidence illegally
seized from a third party) with United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980) (holding that
defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule
if their own fourth amendment rights have been violated).
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intentional errors, 55 on police access to telephone records without
a warrant," on the right of police to make searches incident to an
arrest for minor offenses,17 and on the use of illegally-seized
evidence for impeachment purposes,58 to name just a few.
Similar differences arose in cases of confessions and statements
by the accused.59 The most galling for prosecutors in this area
was People v. Disbrow,' a Supreme Court of California decision
precluding prosecutors from using statements secured in violation
of Miranda v. Arizona6 for impeachment if a defendant testified
differently from his non-coerced but improperly-acquired
confession at trial.62 Disbrow flatly rejected the result and
rationale of the Supreme Court of the United States in Harrisv.
New York. 63 In Harris, the Supreme Court of the United States
found sufficient deterrence in excluding non-Mirandized statements
from the prosecution's case in chief.64 To extend the prohibition
to impeachment uses would provide a license for an accused to

55. Compare People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67,75,583 P.2d 130, 133, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605, 608
(1978) (holding that search warrant must be suppressed if issued upon an affidavit containing
deliberately false statements) with Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding that a
court must excise false statements and weigh remaining portions of affidavit to determine whether
there was probable cause).
56. Compare People v. Blair, 25 CaL 3d 640,655,602 P.2d 738,747,159 Cal. Rptr. 818,827
(19795 (holding that the prosecution is not entitled to telephone records without a judicial
determinatiori comparable to a search warrant procedure) with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745
(1978) (holding that a telephone user has no actual expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed).
57. Compare People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528,534,531 P.2d 1099, 1102,119 Cal. Rptr.
315, 318 (1975) (holding that police have limited authority to conduct searches of persons and their
effects during arrests for minor offenses) with United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)
(holding a full search may be made incident to a lawful arrest and requires no additional justification
under the fourth amendment).
58. Compare People v. Belleci, 24 Cal. 3d 879, 887, 598 P.2d 473,479, 157 Cal. Rptr. 503,
509 (1979) (holding that illegally seized evidence was not admissible for impeachment purposes) with
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1979) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not bar
the use of otherwise suppressible evidence for impeachment purposes).
59. See Attorney General's Guide to Proposition 8, supra note 47, at 213-14 (providing a
detailed listing of differences between California and federal law on confession issues).
60. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
61. 384 U.S. 436 (1964).
62. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. Rptr. at 367.
63. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr.
Rptr. at 368 (rejecting result and rationale of Harris).
64. Harris,401 U.S. at 225. Harris did, however, point out that the statements must satisfy
standards of legal trustworthiness, e.g., they must have been voluntary. Id at 224.
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commit perjury.' In contrast, the California Supreme Court found
the Harris approach would be an incentive for police misconduct
and would make the courts a participant in illegal conduct."
There were other differences between the federal and state
courts on confession cases. For example, federal courts admitted
non-Mirandized booking statements; California courts did not.67
Federal courts allowed police to question a defendant after an
initial refusal to answer, as long as the defendant was readvised of
his rights; California courts did not.68 Federal courts also allowed
admission of statements if the voluntary character of the statement
could be proven by a preponderance of evidence; California courts
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.69
To limit the California courts' ability to develop different
remedies, the drafters of Proposition 8 wrote section 28(d) ("The
Right To Truth-in-Evidence") into the California Constitution.7"
Without mention of the exclusionary rule, section 28(d) mandated
admission of all relevant evidence unless otherwise provided in its

65. kIL
at 225-26.
66. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
67. Compare Rhode Island v. Ianis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980) (holding that a conversation
between the defendant and police was not "interrogation" under Miranda because it was not
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatory response) with People v. Rucker, 26 Cal. 3d 368,388,605
P.2d 843, 855, 162 Cal. Rptr. 13, 25 (1980) (holding that booking statements cannot be used for
incriminatory purposes and,'therefore, Miranda warnings need not be given).
68. Compare Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981) (holding that a post-arrest
statement was admissible even after defendant had invoked his right to consult counsel) with People
v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 245-46, 578 P.2d 108, 116-17, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 869-70 (1978)
(holding that a statement made after defendant had twice refused to speak with police was
inadmissible, even if he had been re-advised of his rights and had been interviewed by a different
police agency).
69. Compare Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,489 (1977) (holding that the prosecution must
prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence) with People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595,607,
580 P.2d 672, 678-79, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172, 178 (1978) (holding that before a confession is admitted
into evidence, the court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of its voluntariness).
70. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(d). Section 28(d) provides:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two thirds vote of the membership
in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding, including pretrial and post-conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or
hearing of ajuvenile court for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court.
Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to
privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code sections 352, 782, or 1103. Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press.
lad
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text. Given the federal Supremacy Clause,7 no evidence could be
admitted in violation of the United States Constitution. However,
under Proposition 8, California would no longer exclude evidence
found to be in violation of the California Constitution's sections on
searches72 and confessions."
In 1985 the Supreme Court of California addressed the issue of
the effect of section 28(d) on existing precedent. In In Re Lance
W.," a case involving the vicarious exclusionary rule,75 the court
reversed existing precedent, finding that California's rules on the
right of third parties to object to illegally-seized evidence were not
federally compelled.76 More importantly, the court held that
section 28(d) nullifies the authority of California's courts to
develop broader remedies on search issues than those provided
Although the actual right against
under federal law.'
unreasonable searches and seizures under the California
Constitution might be unchanged, the same remedy may not be
available, unless compelled by federal law as a means of enforcing
a fourth amendment right.78
In 1988 the Supreme Court of California applied the same
rationale to overrule People v. Disbrow79 when it decided People
28(d) was extended to issues of
v. May.8" Thus, in May section
8
compulsory self-incrimination. '
With Lance W. and May in hand, the trial and appellate courts
appear to be breaking down the remaining differences between

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
vicarious
76.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
Id. § 15.
37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955) (discussing of
exclusionary rule).
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 880, 882-84, 694 P.2d at 747,749-50,210 Cal. Rptr. at 634, 636-

37.
77. Id. at 886-88, 694 P.2d at 752-54, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40.
78. Id. at 886-87, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
79. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976). See supra notes 60-66 and
accompanying text (discussing Disbrow).
80. 44 Cal. 3d 309, 318-20, 748 P.2d 307, 312-13, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 374-75 (1988).
81. Id at 318-20, 748 P.2d at 312-13, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75. It is interesting to note that
statutory privileges, such as the use immunity codified in California Evidence Code section 940, were

excepted from the legal effect of section 28(d). Id at 319-20, 748 P.2d at 313, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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federal and state Fourth 2 and Fifth Amendment-type
protections.83 With California exclusionary law now hitched to
federal standards, prosecutors are receiving added bonuses as the
Supreme Court of the United States relaxes its minimum standards
for admission of evidence derived from searches and from
statements made by the accused.

4

Since 1982, new theories of

admissibility such as the good faith exception"

and the

82. See, e.g., People v. Luevano, 167 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 1128-29, 213 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768
(1985) (federal constitutional grounds prevented the quashing of a search warrant despite a showing
that the officer applying for the warrant made an intentional misstatement to the magistrate and state
constitutional grounds would have invalidated the warrant); People v. Aho, 166 Cal. App. 3d 984,
989-91,212 Cal. Rptr. 686, 689-90 (1985) (court used federal constitutional principles and held that
the search warrant was supported by probable cause even though the showing of probable cause was
insufficient under state grounds); People v. Martino, 166 Cal. App. 3d 777, 786-88, 212 Cal. Rptr.
45, 49-30 (1985) (court held that illegally seized telephone subscriber information could not be
excluded from evidence because federal law did not require its exclusion); People v. Medina, 165
Cal. App. 3d 11, 15-21, 211 Cal. Rptr. 216, 218-22 (1985) (court found the issuance of a search
warrant based on an informant's tip to be valid under federal constitutional principles although
California constitutional principles suggested the warrant was improper).
83. See, e.g., People v. Alcocer, 230 Cal. App. 3d 406,410-12,282 Cal. Rptr. 5,7-8 (1991)
(court held that even though the defendant was not advised of his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination before testifying before the grand jury, violation of this right did not require
suppression of his false grand jury testimony); People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 70-71,775 P.2d
1042, 1046-47, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277-78 (1989) (prosecutor need only prove voluntariness of
confession by a preponderance of evidence); People v. Herbst, 186 Cal. App. 3d 793, 798-800, 233
Cal. Rptr. 123, 126-28 (1986) (court refused to find admission of non-Mirandizedbooking statement
an error of constitutional dimension and suggested that People v. Rucker, 26 Cal. 3d 360, 605 P.2d
843, 162 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1980), was no longer valid precedent).
84. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394,2399 (1990) (ruling that Miranda warnings
are not required when a suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives
a "voluntary statement"); Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1182 (1990) (holding that evidence
of an interrogation that violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel, because it was
obtained after the defendant asked for counsel, was admissible to impeach the defendant); Murray
v. United States, 487 U.S. 533,542-43 (1988) (enlarging the "inevitable discovery' doctrine so that
it now applies to evidence first discovered illegally but later obtained independently in a lawful
manner, untainted by the earlier illegality); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 n.5 (1984)
(holding that a non-Mirandizedstatement made by a probationer to his probation officer is admissible
against the defendant in court).
85. See Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) andMassachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S.
981 (1984) (decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States enunciating good faith exception
to the requirement of probable cause to obtain a search warrant). The good faith exception has been
approved and applied by the California Supreme Court. People v. Camarella, 54 Cal. 3d 592, 602-07,
818 P.2d 63, 67-72, 286 Cal. Rptr. 780, 785-89 (1991).
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consensual search exception!6 have been utilized to admit
questionably-obtained evidence.
Among long-time practitioners, there is a consensus that fewer
cases than ever--and the number was never great--are thrown out
because of a defective search or confession. As police come to
know that they can search, seize and question with what
approximates virtual impunity, diminution in citizen freedom is
inevitable. Recently, the Christopher Commission, formed to
investigate Los Angeles City Police practices after the Rodney
King beating, 7 found that as a practice Los Angeles police
officers "take on" individuals they surmise might be engaged in
illegal activities. 8 As Assistant Chief David Dotson testified:
We expect people to go and aggressively identify people, and
investigate them, and that puts these police officers in the middle

between what they are able to do legally. Ana so it results in police
officers bluffing their way into situations, and when they stop people on
the street, frequently the guy knows, you don't have anything on me,

you don't have any reason, and he knows it very well. And he knows
they're bluffing. And that gets us in, that after time, into these conflict

with manufacturing or at least puffing
situations that end up, frequently
9
of the probable cause.8

It would be naive to think that the Christopher Commission
report, as powerful as its criticism might be, can result in the
reversal of police practices in an era when courts routinely justify
the results of those practices after the fact. The peculiarities of the
Los Angeles Police Department notwithstanding, it is unlikely that

86.

See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 402 U.S. 547 (1991) (decision by the Supreme Court of the

United States expanding the doctrine of consensual encounters).
87. Rodney King, an African-American with a criminal record, was apparently fleeing from
police in a high-speed automobile chase. On stopping, an apparently cooperative and unresisting King
was allegedly beaten senselessly by four Los Angeles Police Department officers whose unrelenting
brutality was captured by a bystander's video camera. The refusal of some 12 officers on the scene
to intercede and stop the beating of King produced extensive public outrage when the videotape was
shown on network television news shows. See Brutalityl, Tn, March 23, 1991, vol. 137, no. 12,
at 16-19 (coverage of Rodney King incident).
88. Report on the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, July 9,
1991 at 99 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journao .
89. Id.
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the problems cited in the Christopher Commission report are
unique to Los Angeles.
B. Trial Evidence
In the campaign against Proposition 8, opponents warned that
the Truth-in-Evidence provision (section 28(d)) could adversely
affect the quality of criminal trial evidence."° Under section 28(d),
all relevant evidence is admissible unless specifically excepted by
28(d). Opponents argued that this would have two major
consequences beyond the changes in search and seizure and
confession law. First, section 28(d) repealed standard, noncontroversial Evidence Code sections.91 Second, opponents argued

90. See supranotes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns voiced by opponents
of Proposition 8). See also Analysis of Proposition8, supra note 19, at 11-13 (criticizing the impact
of Proposition 8 on the California Evidence Code and sound evidentiary rules). The Truth-inEvidence provision was also criticized because it would override California statutory privacy laws
outlawing wiretap evidence and protecting the privacy of bank records. See Gilbert, Roden & Goggin,
Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition8, in CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 7, at 34;
Analysis of Proposition8, supra note 19, at 11, 15. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West 1982)
(wiretap provision); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7460-7493 (West 1982) (California's Financial Privacy
Act). Under the Truth-in-Evidence section, wiretap evidence from a private source would not be
subject to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,475-76
(1920) (holding that the federal exclusionary rule applies only to fruits of searches conducted by
government agents). Bank records secured from any party would likewise be admissible. See United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 445-46 (1975) (holding that bank records are not covered by the
fourth amendment). However, fears regarding wiretap and bank record evidence have not
materialized, primarily because criminal penalties for eavesdropping or wrongfully obtaining bank
records remained in force and individuals testifying on this issue would likely be in violation of the
law. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 632, 637 (West Supp. 1992) (making unauthorized interceptions or
disclosure of telephone conversations punishable as a felony); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7485 (West 1980)
(making unauthorized disclosure or use of financial records punishable as a misdemeanor). Recently,
California enacted legislation allowing wiretapping, but the statute provides for tightly-circumscribed
power similar to the federal wiretapping law. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629-631(c) (West Supp.
1992) (California's wiretap law). Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (West 1991) (federal wiretap law).
California's wiretap provision re-enacted section 631 and its prohibitions against evidence illegally
obtained through wiretapping or eavesdropping. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 111, sec. 4, (re-enacting CAL.
PENAL CODE § 631).
91. Section 28(d) repealed California Evidence Code sections 786 (evidence of traits of
character other than honesty is inadmissible to support or attack a witness' credibility), 787 (evidence
of specific instances of conduct is inadmissible to attack or support a witness' credibility), 790
(evidence of good character of a witness inadmissible unless evidence of bad character has been
introduced), 1101 and 1103 (limiting character evidence), and 1500 (the Best Evidence Rule). CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
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that section 28(d) would throw out Kelly-Frye, the long-accepted
rule for the admission of scientific technical evidence (i.e., that
such evidence must be acceptable within the scientific
community).' According to opponents, without such a rule the
courts would admit evidence such as polygraph examinations and
hypnotically-induced voiceprint identification.93
When confronted with these arguments, supporters of
Proposition 8, including California Senator John Doolittle and
Assistant Attorney General George Nicholson, denied that the
Truth-in-Evidence provision was designed to do anything more than
federalize the standards in search, privacy, and confession cases.
Discounting these criticisms as politically motivated, proponents
promised corrective legislation if any problems emerged.94
Most of the Evidence Code sections thought to be endangered
by the Truth-in-Evidence provision have been re-enacted 5 or have
operated without challenge. Three sections, however, have been
held to be effectively abrogated in criminal cases by Proposition 8-sections 786,96 78797 and 790.9 Prior to Proposition 8, these

92. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 37-41,*549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 1248-51, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 144, 147-48, 152-55 (1976); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
93. Analysis of Proposition 8, supra note 19, at 82. See also Petitioner's Points and
Authorities at 15, Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982) (No. SF
24393) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal)(stating that "[Section 28(d)] sanctions admissibility
of psychics, seers and quacks.. .' ). The Supreme Court of California has declared the Kelly-Frye
rule unaffected by Proposition 8, concluding that the voters did not intend to effect its repeal. People
v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1094, 767 P.2d 619, 649, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 382 (1989).
94. See Egelko, Gann Initiative Called a "Hoax, " San Rafael Indep. Journal, Apr. 1, 1982,
§ E,at 6, col. 1; Egelko Caution Urged on Prop.8, Santa Ana Reg., March 20, 1982, § A, at 7, col.
1 (reporting proponents' reaction to criticisms and their willingness to offer corrective legislation).
See also Editorial Staff Interview, Interview With George Nicholson, L.A. Daily Journal, May 18,
1982, § 1, at p. 4, col. 2 (quoting now-Justice George Nicholson as saying "[i]t is easy to look at
the intentions of the drafters which is (sic] two-fold: One, to abolish the California exclusionary rule
and two, not to do damage to the Evidence Code as such"). Since Proposition 8's passage, the
California Legislature has passed corrective legislation in the areas of polygraph tests and
hypnotically-induced testimony. See CAi. Evm. CODE § 351.1 (West 1966) (excluding evidence
obtained by polygraph tests); id, § 795 (West Supp. 1992) (limiting the circumstances under which
testimony can be taken from a hypnotically-induced witness).
95. See, e.g., 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1432, sec. 1, at 556 (enacting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101);
1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 16, sec. 1, at 99 (enacting CA. Evro. CODE § 1103).
96. CAL. EvrD.CODE § 786 (West 1982). See infra note 99 (describing section 786).
97. Id § 787 (West 1982). See infra note 99 (describing section 787).
98. Id. § 790 (West 1982). See infra note 99 (describing section 790).
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sections tightly controlled the type of credibility evidence
admissible in a criminal trial and kept evidentiary hearings from
drifting away from the essential issues to become a trial of the
character of a witness. 99
The cases that found sections 786, 787, and 790 inoperative
have given both sides in criminal cases broader latitude in attacking
and supporting a witness' credibility. Prosecutors can bolster their
witnesses, especially those under attack, with evidence of instances
of reliability; °0 and they may take on defendants making

99. Specifically, Evidence Code section 786 restricted evidence of a witness' character
supporting or attacking the credibility of that witness to evidence of honesty and veracity. AL § 786.
Evidence of other traits was viewed by the drafters of the Evidence Code as insufficiently probative
of the witness' credibility. See 7 CAL. L. REv. CoMM'N REP. 141 (1965) (California Law Revision
Commission comments to California Evidence Code section 786). "Section 786 limits evidence
relating to the character of a witness to the character of traits necessarily involved in a proper
determination of credibility. Other character traits are not sufficiently probative of a witness' honesty
or veracity." I& But cf. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 313, 696 P.2d 111, 118, 211 Cal. Rptr.
719, 726 (1985) (decision by the Supreme Court of California rejecting restriction of character
evidence in support or against a witness' credibility to evidence of honesty and veracity). The Castro
court stated:
Obviously it is easier to infer that a witness is lying if the felony of which he has been
convicted involves dishonesty as a necessary element than when it merely indicates a 'bad
character' and a readiness to do evil. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a witness' moral
depravity of any kind has some tendency in reason... to shake one's confidence in his
honesty.
Id. Evidence Code section 787 prevented the admission of evidence of specific instances of conduct,
other than evidence of felony convictions, to support or attack the credibility of a witness. CAL EvID.
CODE § 787 (West 1982). Here too, the drafters of the Evidence Code could foresee trials becoming
out of control with vignettes offered by witnesses about other witnesses. See 7 CAL L. REV. COMM'N
REP. 141 (1965) (California Law Revision Commission comments to California Evidence Code
section 787). "Under section 787 . . . evidence of specific instances of a witness' conduct is
inadmissible to prove a trait of his character for the purposes of attacking or supporting his
credibility." Id Section 787 is subject, however, to section 788 permitting evidence of felony
convictions to attack credibility. See CAL Evm. CODE § 787 (West 1982). Finally, section 790
disallowed evidence of good character to support a witness' credibility unless evidence of bad
character had previously been admitted. CAL Evm. CODE § 790 (West 1982). See 7 CAL. L. REV.
COMm'N REP. 141 (1965) (California Law Revision Commission comments to California Evidence
Code section 787).
100. See People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1080,767 P.2d 619, 641,255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 372
(1989) (no error for trial court to allow the prosecutor to bolster the credibility of a witness who had
been an informant in the cases by evidence of past instances of reliability). The Harriscourt found
that the electorate in passing Proposition 8 intended to repeal judicially-created and statutory rules
restricting the admissibility of evidence, except those specifically excepted in the initiative. Id. at
1082, 767 P.2d at 640-41, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74. The Harriscourt stated its agreement with the
Third District Court of Appeal in People v. Taylor, 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 631, 225 Cal. Rptr. 733,
737-38 (1986) "that section 28(d) effected a pro tanto repeal of Evidence Code section 790, and [we]
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exaggerated claims

about themselves. 1 '

It is the

author's

observation that defense counsel are given greater latitude to attack
policeman with instances of brutality on their service record, as
well as to attack professional informants. Greater latitude in the

questioning
Additionally,

of

rape

victims

has

also

been

granted."

defense attorneys can bolster defendants with

witnesses attesting to their veracity."' In certain cases, either side
may be able to impeach witnesses with misdemeanor rather than
felony convictions."° In all probability, the impeachment of
witnesses for specific traits other than those proven by felony
conviction will be extended to instances which tend to show the

find no basis on which to distinguish Evidence Code sections 786 and 787." Harris,47 Cal. 3d at
1081, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373. In arriving at this conclusion, the Harris court also
relied on the Legislative Analysts' statement in the Ballot Pamphlet for Proposition 8:
Under current law, certain evidence is not permitted to be presented in a criminal trial or
hearing. For example, evidence obtained through unlawful eavesdropping or wiretapping,
or through unlawful searches of persons or property, cannot be used in court. This
measure would generally allow most relevant evidence to be presented in criminal cases,
subject to such exceptions as the Legislature may in the future enact by a two-thirds vote.
Legislative Analyst of California, Analysis, in CAL. BALLOT PAMWRLzr, supra note 7, at 32.
However, it is arguably a non-sequitur that the voters intended to repeal existing Evidence Code
provisions not touching upon privacy issues. Moreover, the court's reasoning is difficult to square
with its conclusion in Harris that section 28(d) did not abrogate the Kelly-Frye rule and admit
polygraphs. Harris,47 Cal. 3d at 1094, 767 P.2d at 649, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 382. See supra notes 92-93
(discussing the Kelly-Frye rule). If evidence is probative and reliable, albeit not yet "accepted"
within the scientific community, would it not be admissible under Evidence Code section 352 and,
therefore, under section 28(d)?
101. See People v. Lankford, 210 Cal. App. 3d 227, 232, 240, 258 Cal. Rptr. 322, 324, 329
(1989) (finding that contrary to Evidence Code section 786, it was not error for a trial court to allow
a prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant in a gun case about a pending robbery charge, where the
defendant had claimed, "I didn't have no incident since I've been out").
102. See People v. Adams, 198 Cal. App. 3d 10, 16-19, 243 Cal. Rptr. 580, 583-85 (1988)
(holding it was error in a rape case to prevent the defense from cross-examining the complainant
about past false complaints; under Evidence Code section 787 this type of evidence would not have
been admissible).
103. See People v. Taylor, 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 628-32, 225 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735-38 (1986)
(contrary to California Evidence Code section 790, it was error to prevent the defense from presenting
evidence of the defendant-witness' reputation for truth and veracity where that reputation had not
been attacked).
104. See Harris,47 Cal. 3d at 1090 n.22, 767 P.2d at 647 n.22, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 380 n.22
(noting that Evidence Code section 788, limiting impeachment to felony criminal records, could no
longer prevent admission of relevant evidence of misdemeanors).
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witnesses' "readiness to do evil" or "bad character," and will be
somewhat analogous to the post-Proposition 8 admission of felonies.'0 5
It should not be forgotten that trial judges retain great discretion
to control the nature and extent of this kind of evidence. Under
California Evidence Code section 352, judges may exclude
evidence that is not probative, is unduly prejudicial, or is time
consuming. 1 6 For that reason, trials after Proposition 8 are not
much different from those before it; the changes made by
Proposition 8 and the cases interpreting its provisions hardly
represent anything but modest change, affording small advantages
for each side.
I1. PRIOR CONVICTIONS
A. Attacking Credibility
Prior to the passage of Proposition 8, California Evidence Code
section 788 allowed parties to impeach witnesses with evidence of
felony convictions. 0 7 However, in People v. Beagle 8 the
Supreme Court of California held that section 788 was a permissive
statute that gave trial courts the discretion to exclude evidence of
prior felony convictions." 9 The court reasoned that many felony
convictions did not involve dishonesty or moral turpitude, or the
convictions were remote in time, and therefore would not be
germane to the issue of a witness' present veracity or
credibility."0 The Beagle court was also concerned with prior
convictions for the same offense with which a defendant was
currently charged; the court felt that admitting evidence of such

105. See People v. Wheeler, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1406, 1414,281 Cal. Rptr. 758,762-63 (1991),
review granted, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304 (1991) (holding that prosecutor can use a
misdemeanor conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude to impeach a witness). See also
infra notes 106-155 and accompanying text (discussing post-Proposition 8 admission of felony
convictions).
106. CA. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).

107.

CAL. Evm. CODE § 788 (West 1982).

108.
109.
110.

6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313 (1972).
l at 452-53, 492 P.2d at 7, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20.
Id. at 453, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
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convictions would create pressure for lay jurors to conclude that
because the defendant committed the crime once, the defendant

must have committed the crime charged.' Accordingly, because
prior convictions often have prejudicial effect beyond the limited
function of attacking credibility, the Beagle court required judges
to weigh the probative value of the introduction of prior
n2
convictions against the possible prejudice.
Following Beagle, a line of cases from the state courts
tightened restrictions on the use of prior felony convictions to
attack credibility." 3 For defense attorneys, Beagle and its
progeny removed significant impediments to a defendant's taking
the stand. Impeachment of the accused with a prior conviction
often has a devastating effect on the defense case. No cautionary
instruction to jurors to use evidence of a prior conviction solely to
weigh the witness' credibility can undo the damage.
However, prosecutors found irksome the California Supreme
Court's tendency to shelter juries from the fact of defendants' prior
felony convictions. By 1982, prosecutors were finding it
increasingly difficult to attack a defendant's (or a defense witness')
credibility by asking about former felony convictions. In his dissent

111. Id. at 451-54, 492 P.2d at 6-9, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 318-21.
112. Id.
113. See People v. Barrick, 33 Cal. 3d 115, 122-30, 654 P.2d 1243, 1246-48, 187 Cal. Rptr.
716, 719-26 (1982) (error for trial judge to sanitize the prior conviction for auto theft in an auto theft
case because it allowed the jury to speculate about the nature of prior offense); People v. Spearman,
25 Cal. 3d 107, 113-19,599 P.2d 74,76-80, 157 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885-90 (1979) (abuse of discretion
to introduce a prior conviction for possession of narcotics in a narcotics case-possession of narcotics
did not involve dishonesty); People v. Fries, 24 Cal. 3d 222, 226-34 594 P.2d 19, 22-27, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 194, 197-202 (1979) (error to admit prior conviction for robbery in a current robbery case were
no dissimilar prior convictions were available); People v. Woodward, 23 Cal. 3d 329, 334-42, 590
P.2d 391, 393-99, 152 Cal. Rptr. 536, 538-44 (1979) (trial court should have exercised its discretion
to exclude evidence of prior convictions for voluntary manslaughter and being a felon in possession
of a gun, because these convictions ostensibly had no bearing on truthfulness); People v. Rollo, 20
Cal. 3d 109, 838-41, 569 P.2d 771, 773-77 (1977) (error to admit only the fact of the prior
conviction, leaving the defense with an option to disclose nature of the prior conviction); People v.
Rist, 16 Cal. 3d 211, 218-23, 545 P.2d 833, 838-41, 127 Cal. Rptr. 457, 462-65 (1976) (abuse of
discretion found in the introduction of a prior conviction for robbery in a current robbery case where
dissimilar prior convictions were also available); People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 96-100, 539 P.2d
43, 54-56, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 486-88 (1975) (introduction of a prior conviction required reversal
because prior conviction was remote in time).
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in People v. Barrick,"4 Justice Richardson expressed the feelings

of many prosecutors: "[T]he majority has steadily and
to the
unnecessarily circumscribed the application of section 788
15
intent."
legislative
clear
a
of
remains
little
where
point
With this background, the drafters of Proposition 8 wrote article
I, section 28(f) into California's constitution, providing that "[a]ny
prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding,
whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without
limitation for purposes of impeachment . . . in any criminal

proceeding."" ' 6 So emphatic was this language that all concerned
parties expected- section 28(f) to nullify People v. Beagle. The
critics of Proposition 8 acknowledged the breadth of this provision,
which they claimed would allow for the smearing of witnesses with
out-of-date prior convictions." 7 The Los Angeles District
Attorney and the California Attorney General issued written
statements asserting that under section 28(f) all priors, no matter
how old or for what crime, were admissible with Proposition 8's
11
passage.
However, one detail was overlooked. Subdivision 28(d) (the
Truth-in-Evidence provision), provides: "Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to
privilege or hearsay or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782, or 1103.
..

.,,n9 By allowing California Evidence Code section 352 to be

unaffected by the section--which the Supreme Court of California
later interpreted as referring to section 28(d) as well as section
28(f) 121--the drafters of Proposition 8 gave Beagle a chance to

114. 33 Cal. 3d 115, 654 P.2d 1243, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1982).
115. Id. at 136, 654 P.2d at 1257, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
116. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f) (enacted by Proposition 8) (emphasis added).
117. See Attorney General'sGuide, supra note 47, at 244.
118. See id.(California Attorney General's assertion that all prior convictions were admissible
under Proposition 8); Memorandum from District Attorney John K. Van De Kamp to Deputy District
Attorneys, reprinted in CriminalPracticeAfter Proposition8, at 331-32 (June 9, 1982) (copy on file
at Pacific Law Journal)(Los Angeles County District Attorney's assertion that all prior convictions
were admissible under Proposition 8).
119. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(d) (enacted by Proposition 8) (emphasis added).
120. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301,310, 696 P.2d 111, 116,211 Cal. Rptr. 719,724 (1985).
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survive since Beagle was based on Evidence Code section 352's
prohibition of unduly prejudicial evidence.
In 1985 the Supreme Court of California did in fact adopt this
approach in People v. Castro.121 In an opinion by Justice Kaus,
with Justices Mosk and Broussard concurring, the court found that
section 28(f) was clearly intended to abrogate the "rigid, blackletter rules of exclusions... grafted onto the code" by the postBeagle line of decisions. 22 However, the majority of the court
did not accept the Attorney General's position that section 28(f)
was intended to abolish the trial court's discretion to restrict the
use of priors for impeachment purposes. 123 Thus, California
Evidence Code section 352 was kept alive in section 28(f), and
with it, the underlying basis of Beagle; that is, prior convictions are
subject to "the inherent power of the trial court to control the
admission of evidence by the exercise of discretion to exclude
marginally relevant but prejudicial matter.... 124
In formulating a test that would reconcile Proposition 8's
express purpose to allow a wider range of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes with Evidence Code section 352's
requirement that the probative value of such evidence outweigh the
prejudicial effect, the Castro court formulated a new standard: If
prior- convictions are to be used for impeachment, they must
involve a crime of moral turpitude. 5 Borrowing from Justice
Holmes, Justice Kaus' opinion stated that an offense of moral
turpitude was one indicating "a readiness to do evil," "a bad
character," including offenses of moral depravity such as child
molestation, torture, and, sometimes, violence. 126 Although such
offenses do not themselves directly involve honesty, they provide
a rational basis by which a juror can conclude a witness is

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
case, the
126.
(1884)).

38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).

Id. at 312, 696 P.2d at 117, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
Id.
Id. at 306, 696 P.2d at 113, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
Id. at 314, 696 P.2d at 118, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 726. However, as had previously been the
crime did not necessarily have to involve dishonesty. Id
Id (referring to Holmes' reasoning in Gertz v. FitchburgRailroad, 137 Mass. 77, 78
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"unworthy of credit" or is to be disbelieved.' 2 7 Justice Kaus'
opinion also noted that admitting a prior conviction for a felony
would run
that did not bear a relationship to a witness' credibility
28
1
constitution.
the
of
clause
afoul of the due process
Undoubtedly, proponents of Proposition 8 were disappointed
with the rule in Castro.2 9 However, an analysis of reported cases
since the Castro decision indicates that appellate courts have
approved the introduction of priors which would have been
excluded prior to Proposition 8's passage. Defendants have been
child
impeached for assaultive offenses, 3 ' escape, 13 '
1 33
132
voluntary
and
rape,
statutory
molestation,
manslaughter. 33 Today, defendants are cross-examined regarding
prior convictions for offenses that are identical, or nearly identical,
to the crime with which they are currently charged despite its

potential for undue prejudice. 135 The possibility of such crossexamination undoubtedly is weighed by the defense when deciding

whether the defendant will take the stand and, in fact, whether to
go to trial at all.
B. Proving Prior Convictions as an Element of the Crime
Prior to the passage of Proposition 8, in offenses where the
in
felony conviction is a predicate of the crime (e.g., felon 137
3
conviction),

possession of a gun, ' petty theft with a prior

127. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 315, 696 P.2d at 119, 211 Cal Rptr. at 727.
128. Id. at 314, 696 P.2d at 119, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
129. See Greenberg,Impeachment With UnchargedMisconduct,24 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 621,62829 (1991) (criticizing Castro rationale).
130. People v. Armendariz, 174 Cal. App. 3d 674, 681, 220 Cal. Rptr. 229, 232-33 (1985);
People v. Cavazos, 172 Cal. App. 3d 589, 593-95, 218 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271-73 (1985).
131. People v. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d 991, 1010-11,782 P.2d 627,639-40,264 Cal. Rptr. 386,39899 (1989).
132. People v. Massey, 192 Cal. App. 3d 819, 823, 237 Cal. Rptr. 734, 736-37 (1987).
133. People v. Flucher, 194 Cal. App. 3d 749, 754, 236 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848 (1987).
134. People v. Foster, 201 Cal. App. 3d 20, 25-26, 246 Cal. Rptr. 855, 857-58 (1988).
135. See, e.g., People v. Dillingham, 186 Cal. App. 3d 688, 695, 231 Cal. Rptr. 20, 21-23
(1986); People v. Stewart, 171 Cal. App. 59, 66, 215 Cal. Rptr. 716, 720-21 (1985) (approving the
admission of prior convictions identical, or nearly identical, to the offense charged).
136. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021 (West 1982).
137. See id. § 666 (West 1988).
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the Supreme Court of California allowed defendants to stipulate to
the existence of the felony and thereby avoid having that
information heard by the jury."' To combat this, the authors of
Proposition 8 added another important sentence to article I, section
28(f): "When a prior felony conviction is an element of any felony
' 139
offense, it shall be proven to the trier of fact in open court.
This language in section 28(f) was directed squarely at People
v. Hall, 40 allowing defendants in "ex-felon with a gun
cases"' 141 to stipulate to their prior felony convictions, thereby
preventing juries from learning of the existence of the defendant's
prior felony convictions. 142 After Proposition 8's passage, the
Supreme Court of California, in People v. Valentine, 43 found that
section 28(f) invalidated Hall,'44 and that the status of the
defendant as an ex-felon must be presented to the jury, regardless
45
of any stipulation between the prosecutor and the defense.1
However, the court in Valentine did say, and the Attorney General
agreed, that if the defendant stipulated to his status as a felon, the
actual nature of the conviction and the number of convictions
should be withheld from the jury. 146 The Valentine court agreed
that this had been the case law prior to Hall, and section 28(f) was
not intended to upset pre-Hall precedent. 4 7 In other words, a
defendant charged as an ex-felon with a gun, who was three times
convicted of robbery, could stipulate to his felony status and the
jury would learn only that he was a felon and not the nature and
frequency of his convictions. Any other result, the Valentine court

138. See People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 152, 616 P.2d 826, 831, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 849
(1980) (discussed infra notes 140-147).
139. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(f) (enacted by Proposition 8) (emphasis added).
140. 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 826, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980).
141. See CA.. PENAL CODE § 12021 (West 1982) (prohibiting possession of guns by felons).
142. Hall 28 Cal. 3d at 152, 616 P.2d at 831, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
143. 42 Cal. 3d 170, 720 P.2d 913, 228 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1986).
144. IkL at 173, 720 P.2d at 914, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
145. lR
146. Id
147. Id at 176-77,720 P.2d at 916,228 Cal. Rptr. at 28. See People v. Morrison, 67 Cal. App.
3d 425, 428, 136 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (pre-Hall case holding that only one prior could be disclosed
to the jury since only one was necessary to establish the defendant's ex-felon status as required under
Penal Code section 12021).
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reasoned, would encounter problems with the federal due process
clause, because it would allow a jury to hear information having
"no tendency in reason" to prove anything the prosecution must
show to establish a violation of Penal Code section 12021.148
Interestingly enough, the Attorney General's position in
Valentine represented a reversal from what his office had written
in its Guide to Proposition 8 in June of 1982.149 There the
Attorney General opined:
A defendant, however, could not stipulate simply to the fact of the prior
conviction convictions so the trier of fact would not know the exact
nature of the prior conviction. The tenor of subdivision (f) is that the

trier of fact is to know of the nature of any prior felony conviction used
against a defendant for any purpose. A stipulation only as to the fact of
the prior and not the exact nature would defeat the goal of the
authors.

150

In 1982, the Attorney General also believed that section 28(f)
applied to "petty theft with a prior conviction" cases.15 ' After a
long series of conflicting court of appeal cases, the Supreme Court
of California ended the debate in People v. Bouzas,152 holding
that section 28(f) did not apply to petty theft with a prior
conviction cases: the prior conviction to be proven was to be used
153
as a sentence enhancement, not as an element of the crime.
Although the court (through former Chief Justice Bird) was hard
pressed to logically distinguish the use of felonies in "petty theft
with prior conviction" cases from the use of felonies in "ex-felon
with a gun" cases, the court found that the drafters of section 28(f)
did not intend to apply it to petty theft with prior conviction
cases.154 Whatever the merits of its historical findings, the court

148.
149.
150.
151.

Valentine, 42 Cal. 3d at 177, 720 P.2d at 917, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
Attorney General's Guide, supra note 47, at 254.
Id.
Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West 1988) (definition of petty theft with a prior

conviction).
152.
153.
154.

53 Cal. 3d 467, 807 P.2d 1076, 279 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1991).
IM.at 480, 807 P.2d at 1085, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
Id. at 479-80, 807 P.2d at 1085, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
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mercifully put an end to appellate argument that had gone on too
long with too many inconsistent results.'55
Il. INSANTY AND DIMINISHED CAPACITY
A. Insanity
In 1978 the California Supreme Court in People v. Drew'56
overturned 122 years of criminal insanity precedent. Until then,
157
California adhered to the historic 19th century M'Naghten test,
excusing persons from criminal responsibility for their acts if, at
the time the crime was committed, they did not know the nature
and quality of the acts, or could not tell the difference between
right and wrong.'58
In place of M'Naghten, the court in Drew adopted the more
flexible test from the American Law Institute (hereinafter A.L.I.):
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] 1of
his
59
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
The principal difference between the M'Naghten and A.L.I.
tests was that under M'Naghten, a person could be held liable for
a criminal act resulting from a mental condition that person was
powerless to control, if that person understood the nature and
quality of the acts and knew the difference between right and
wrong at the time of the offense." In contrast, the A.L.I. test

155. See kL at 477, 807 P.2d 1083-84, 279 Cal. Rptr. 853-54 (summary of the conflicting
cases).
156. 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978).
157. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
158. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d at 336,583 P.2d at 1318-19,149 Cal. Rptr. at 275. The M'Naghten rule
has long been the accepted test in a majority of jurisdictions in the United States. W. LEFAVE & A.
Scorr, CRUIUNAL LAW § 4.2, at 310 (2d ed. 1986).
159. Drew, at 345, 583 P.2d at 1324, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 281 (quoting MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
160. l at 346, 583 P.2d at 1325, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
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goes beyond M'Naghten to reach a very small group of defendants,
such as people with organic brain damage who are unable to
conform themselves to society's law because of this mental defect
or illness, but who still know that what they do is61wrong and
understand the nature and consequences of their acts.1
For all the historic and jurisprudential significance of Drew, its
impact on insanity verdicts was virtually invisible. In 1976, two
years before Drew, insanity verdicts represented .62 percent (a total
of 209) of all Superior Court of California convictions. 162 In
1980, two years after Drew, insanity verdicts represented .66% (a
total of 259) of all Superior Court of California convictions.' 63
However, Drew's symbolic and political impact was anything but
invisible. Law and order advocates cited it as further evidence that
the Supreme Court of California under then-Chief Justice Rose
Bird was willing to disregard precedent to give criminals a
break." 4 For such advocates, almost any insanity defense was a
way for dangerous criminals to escape punishment. But Drew made
matters worse and raised the specter of additional killers being put
back on the streets after brief stays in mental hospitals.
Proposition 8 added section 25(b) to the California Penal Code
to restore the M'Naghten test:
In any criminal proceeding, including any juvenile court proceeding, in
which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense
shall be found by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of
knowing or understanding the nature and the quality of his or her act
right from wrong at the time of the commission
and of distinguishing
65
offense.'
the
of
The language in proposed Penal Code section 25(b) did not,
however, state the M'Naghten test correctly. Since its origin in

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Analysis of Proposition8, supra note 19, at 41.
Id
See, e.g., id at 25.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (enacted by Proposition 8) (emphasis added).
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1843 and throughout its history in California, M'Naghten held that
an accused was insane if, at the time of the offense, he could not
understand the nature and the quality of his act or was unable to
distinguish between right and wrong. 166 The test written in
section 25(b) required the accused to prove both.
There is no evidence that the drafters of Proposition 8 wanted
their version of M'Naghten to be more restrictive than the
formulation of the M'Naghten test existing in California prior to
the Drew decision. However, regardless of the drafter's intent, the
text of Penal Code section 25(b) was quite clear.167 Moreover, in
determining an initiative's intent, and therefore its effect, courts
usually emphasize the electorate's understanding thereof.16 By
this standard, Penal Code section 25(b) might well have been given
a literal reading. The analysis by the Legislative Analyst in the
ballot pamphlet distributed to every voter stated:
This measure would provide that in order to be found not guilty by
reason of insanity a defendant must prove that he or she (1) was
incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and the quality of his
or her actions and (2) was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong
at the time of the crime. These provisions could increase the difficulty
169
of proving that a person is not guilty by reason of insanity.

The distinction between Proposition 8's proposed M'Naghten
test and the traditional M'Naghten did not escape notice. Before the
election, critics of Proposition 8 often pointed to the conjunctive
language in the proposed Penal Code section 25(b) and argued that
it was stringent to the point of being unconstitutional. 170

166. See People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230,235 (1864); People v. Hoin, 62 Cal. 120 (1882) (two
early cases stating M'Naghten test in the disjunctive); People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765,772-75,704
P.2d 752,755-58,217 Cal. Rptr. 685,688-91 (1985) (discussing cases and history of MNaghten rule
in California).
167. See Skinner at 786, 704 P.2d at 765-66, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99 (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
(indicating that section 25(b)'s language was unambiguous).
168. See People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1082, 767 P.2d 619, 641,255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 374
(1989); People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 312, 696 P.2d 111, 117, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 725 (1985).
169. Legislative Analyst of California, Analysis, in CAL. BALLOT PAmPHi.=, supra note 7, at
55 (emphasis added).
170. Analysis of Proposition 8, supra note 19, at 39.
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Responding, Republican members of the Assembly Committee on
Criminal Justice admitted section 25(b) was more stringent than the
traditional M'Naghten test, but also stated that it was "a common
would foist upon juries an easily
sense answer to those who
171
manipulable insanity test."
In People v. Skinner,172 the Supreme Court of California
heard an appeal from a finding of sanity where the trial court
required the defense to prove that the defendant was unable to
understand the nature and the quality of his acts and that the
defendant could not tell right from wrong. 17' In Skinner, the
Attorney General conceded that section 25(b) was intended 1to
74
restore the M'Naghten test as it had existed before Drew.
However, the Attorney General also argued that the two prongs of
M'Naghten substantially stated the same thing: to understand the
nature and quality of one's act is to know the difference between
75
right and wrong.1
The Skinner court found that Proposition 8 had indeed sought
to restore M'Naghten in its traditional form; in fact, a literal
76
reading would undoubtedly render it unconstitutional. 1
However, the court rejected the Attorney General's argument that
the two prongs in M'Naghten meant virtually the same thing.'77
Although a person who is unable to understand the nature and the
quality of his acts is, necessarily, unable to distinguish between
right and wrong, the reverse is not true.' A person committing
a homicide can quite clearly understand what he is doing, and yet,
due to some delusion, not know that what he is doing is
wrong. 179

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

In Defense of Victims, supra note 12, at 26.
39 Cal. 3d 765,704 P.2d 752, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1985).
Id. at 769, 704 P.2d at 754, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
IzE at 777, 704 P.2d at 759-60, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
Id.
Id. at 769, 704 P.2d at 754, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
Id. at 777-78, 704 P.2d at 759-60, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88.
Id.
Id.
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The fallacy the court found in the Attorney General's position
80
was their view that "wrong" meant "legal wrong.'
Throughout its history, California's interpretation of the M'Naghten
standard addressed itself to defendants who were actuated by their
8
own moral commands which were the products of mental illness.1 1
Skinner's restatement of M'Naghten and its rejection of the
Attorney General's position saved the insanity defense from near
extinction. It meant that many of the severest cases in the criminal
courts could receive treatment in a state hospital rather than be
punished with life terms. Nevertheless, insanity commitments have,
in recent years, sharply fallen off, as Figure 1 indicates.

180.
181.
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FIGURE 1
INSANITY ADMISSIONS
1975 TO 1991112
Number of
Year

Admissions

1975-76

211

1976-77

209

1977-78

169

1978-79

187

1979-80

270

1980-81

223

1981-82

228

1982-83

216

1983-84

162

1984-85

138

1985-86

145

1986-87

135

1987-88

126

1988-89

114

1989-90

97

1990-91

76

Significant Dates

(Drew decided Sept. 21, 1978)

(Proposition 8 passed June 8, 1982)

(Skinner decided Sept. 16, 1985)

The sharp fall off in insanity commitments in recent years is in
large part due to the fact that M'Naghten is a tougher standard than
Drew was. However, Figure 1 indicates that today's numbers are

182. California Department of Mental Health, AdmissionsforNot Guilty by Reason of Insanity
(Statistics and Data Analysis, Oct. 23, 1991) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
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less than in the years before Drew (1975-1976 to 1981-1982). That,
perhaps, can be explained by the fact that the insanity verdict has
in recent years become a less attractive option for the defense.
Today, those committed under insanity findings are confined for
periods comparable to a sentence in state prison, sometimes for a
longer period, and often past the time of their recovery.18 A
committed person's release, through discharge or parole, is subject
to an administrative hearing and court approval and, except at the
point of maximum confinement, persons committed184are not entitled
to a jury trial on the issue of their restored sanity.
Afraid to take responsibility for the patient, judges and
administrative panels are squeamish about releases. 85 For the
most part, the decision to choose or not to choose an insanity plea
has become a Hobson's choice.
B. Diminished Capacity
For over a century, California law has allowed evidence of
voluntary intoxication to be considered to determine whether an
accused acted with a particular motive, purpose, or intent necessary
to commit a crime."6 In 1949, the California Supreme Court in
People v. Wells"7 said that psychiatric testimony could be
admitted in much the same way to decide whether the defendant
"did or did not ... possess the specific essential mental state";
i.e., malice aforethought or intent to kill.'88 Such evidence was
183. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.5(a)(1) (West 1985) (maximum length of commitment in
felony cases can be computed on the basis of what the patient would have received had the patient

been sent to state prison with an upper base term with enhancements). The patient is not entitled to
work-time credits that cut 50% off state prison time. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933(a) (West Supp.
1992); People v. Bodis, 174 Cal. App. 3d 435, 437-38, 220 Cal. Rptr. 57, 58 (1985).
184. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 1026.2, 1026.5(a)(4), 1026.5(a)(5) (West 1985).
185. The California Department of Mental Health reports that during the last four years (198687 through 1990-91) the number of conditional releases (Le., release on recommendation of state
mental hospitals with court approval) for persons incarcerated under insanity commitments has
dropped for all but one year. Conditional releases have also declined in proportion to the number of
insanity commitments in state hospitals. Telephone interview with Gleyns Smiley, Analyst,
Department of Mental Health, March 11, 1992 (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal).
186. CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(b) (Vest 1988).
187. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
188. Id at 350-51, 202 P.2d at 66.
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not limited to a trial of sanity, but also applied to the essential
issues of guilt."8 9 Eleven years later, in People v. Gorshen,19"

the Supreme Court of California stated that experts in psychiatry
could testify regarding whether the accused possessed the mental

state of malice aforethought, deliberation, or premeditation required
for the offense of murder.' 9 1

Wells and Gorshen marked the beginning of what was to be
called the diminished capacity defense. By allowing the
introduction of evidence of mental impairment, the Supreme Court
of California sought an alternative to the rigidities of the
M'Naghten standard,"9 with an underlying belief that seriously
emotionally ill persons should not be judged and punished in 93the
same fashion as those who acted without the same handicaps.'
In 1964, in People v. Wolff,"94 the California Supreme Court

developed another aspect of diminished capacity law in cases of
people with definable psychiatric conditions, requiring as proof of
first degree murder that they premeditated and deliberated maturely
and meaningfully.195 The concept of diminished capacity took a
quantum jump in 1966 with People v. Conley,19 6 a case involving
the double murder of a husband and wife. 197 A defense

189. 1,
190. 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
191. I, at 726, 336 P.2d at 498.
192. See supra notes 156-185 (discussing the M'Naghten standard).
193. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d at 343, 583 P.2d at 1323, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
194. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959,40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
195. 1d at 820-21, 394 P.2d at 976, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 288. In Wo/ff, the 15-year-old defendant
who was charged as an adult for murdering his mother had his first degree murder conviction reduced
to second degree murder. Id Although there was evidence of deliberation, premeditation, wilfulness,
and even of complex planning, the court found:
[Tihis defendant was not and is not a fully normal and mature, mentally well
person.... The use by the Legislature of "wilful, deliberate, and premeditated" in
conjunction indicates its intent to require as an essential element of first degree
murder... substantially more reflection, more understanding and comprehension of the
character of the act than a mere amount of thought necessary to form the intent to kill.
Id at 822, 394 P.2d at 976, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
196. 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
197. Id. at 314-16, 411 P.2d at 913-14,49 Cal. Rptr. at 817-18. Conley was convicted of first
degree murder for killing a husband and wife. Id at 314, 411 P.2d at 913, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
Conley had been involved in an affair with the wife, but she had ended it and reconciled with her
husband. Id at 315, 411 P.2d at 914-15, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 817-18. Conley became despondent, did
much drinking (his blood alcohol level was over .21 (alcohol) at the time of the killing), and
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psychiatrist described Conley's condition as dissociation due to
personality fragmentation which prevented the function of his
normal personality.'98
The Supreme Court of California reversed Conley's conviction,
finding error in the trial court's refusal to give a requested
voluntary manslaughter instruction.'
The instruction was
required even though the jury might conclude the defendant acted
with premeditation, deliberation, and wilfulness." ° Conley's
mental illness, the court held, may have been sufficient to negate
malice:
If because of mental defect, disease, or intoxication, however, the
defendant is unable to comprehend his duty to govern his actions in

accord with the duty imposed by law, he does not act with malice
aforethought and cannot be guilty of first degree murder. Confronted
with this evidence, the court or a jury could conclude that the defendant

killed intentionally, with premeditation and deliberation, but did not do
so with malice aforethought.20 '

With these words, the Supreine Court of California broke new
ground. For one thing, the court found that malice was not
necessarily equated with an intent to kill in cases where the
prosecution relied on evidence of premeditation and
deliberation.2 2 Malice might be found lacking if, because of
intoxication or mental illness, the accused was unaware of "his
duty to govern his actions in accord with the duty imposed by
law." ' 203 Additionally, the court recognized a new definition of
voluntary manslaughter, outside of the statutory language,

practiced shooting targets before the killings. Id. at 314-15, 411 P.2d at 913-14,49 Cal. Rptr. at 81718.
198. Id. at 315, 411 P.2d at 914, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
199. Id at 314, 411 P.2d at 913, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
200. Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
201. Id. at 322-23, 411 P.2d at 919, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822,
202. Id
203. Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822. "An awareness of the obligation to act
within the general bodies of laws regulating society ... is included in the statutory definition of
implied malice in terms of an abandoned or malignant heart and in the definition of express malice
as the deliberate intention unlawfully to take life.'" Id
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applicable to cases of intentional killing where mental illness
of the accused's inability to
prevented a finding of malice because
24
understand his duty to society. 0
In 1974 the court in People v. Poddar2 5 took Conley's
concepts of malice and non-statutory manslaughter a step further.
Poddarwas a case of a love-obsessed man killing the woman who
was the object of his affection. 2' 6 Both defense and prosecution
psychiatrists concluded that Poddar was a paranoid schizophrenic,
but the experts disagreed on Poddar's ability to harbor the requisite
intent for first or second degree murder.2 7 The trial court
instructed the jury, per Conley, that malice may have been negated
in the killings, if the defendant, due to mental illness, was unaware
of his duty to conform his actions to society's laws; if the jury
found this to be true, they must not find murder in the first
degree. 208 The jury returned a second degree verdict, finding that
Poddar had acted out of a base, anti-social motive.29
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court of California
said that the trial court's instruction was insufficient; malice may
be negated not only where the defendant, due to mental illness,
lacks an awareness of the duty not to commit acts that carry risks
of grave injury or death, but also in those situations where despite
a defendant's awareness of the duty not to commit such acts, the
mental impairment makes it impossible for the defendant to prevent
such acts. 210 Thus, after Poddar, under California law the
inability of a person to form a volitional intent to act, stemming

204. Id. at 319,411 P.2d at 917, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 821. Prior to the Conley decision, the court
had stated that evidence of mental illness or intoxication could negate malice in the sense that it
prevented the defendant from forming a specific intent to kill. People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482,
490-91, 386 P.2d 677, 682, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 82 (1963). Under Conley, malice could be negated,
despite the specific intent to kill. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d at 322-23, 411 P.2d at 822-23, 49 Cal. Rptr. at
918-19. For all intents and purposes, malice had become a separate element of the crime.
205. 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974).
206. Id. at 753-54, 518 P.2d at 343-45, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13.
207. Id. at 754, 518 P.2d at 345, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 753, 518 P.2d at 344, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
210. Id. at 759-60, 518 P.2d at 348, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 916. The court's formulation has often

been referred to as the "irresistible impulse" test, and outside of California it is usually used in
insanity cases. See Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d at 814, 394 P.2d at 971, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
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from a mental impairment, could reduce offenses from murder to
211
manslaughter.
It is important to understand that, except in insanity pleas, the
defendant had only to raise a reasonable doubt that the mental
impairment negated his ability to form the required state of mind
in order to disprove the element of malice necessary to the
prosecution's case. Additionally, in each case where the defense
produced evidence of mental impairment, the defendant was
entitled to "pinpoint" instructions on the applicable law.21 In
213
fact, these instructions were required sua sponte.
By the time of the Dan White case,214 the diminished capacity
law had become complex and fraught with difficulties for the court
and the prosecution. With the Dan White case, the long simmering
resentment against the Supreme Court of California and its case
law came to a boil. In 1981, after hearings, delays, and
amendments, the Governor signed Senate Bill 54,215 a bill
designed to repeal .most of the case law in the area of diminished
capacity. Among other provisions, Senate Bill 54: (1) Declared "as
a public policy" that the defenses of diminished capacity,
diminished responsibility, and irresistible impulse were abolished

211. Actually, the Supreme Court of California did, previous to Conley, authorize the
"irresistible impulse test" to prove diminished capacity. People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 685-86,
504 P.2d 1256, 1264-65, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792, 800-01 (1973).
212. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d at760,518 P.2dat350, 111 Cal. Rptr. at918.
213. Id.
214. In 1979, Dan White, a former San Francisco Supervisor, shot and killed Mayor George
Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk. Klawans, The Twinkie Defense, 18 LmoAoON, Fall 1991,
at 59. White was charged with murder, including an allegation-of special circumstances which could
permit imposition of the death penalty. Information at 2, People v. Daniel James White, San
Francisco Superior Court (No. 98663) (Feb. 2, 1979). At White's trial, psychiatrists testified that at
the time of the killing he was suffering from serious emotional disorders that impaired his ability to
form malice aforethought. People v. White, 117 Cal. App. 3d 270, 277, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615
(1981). One psychiatrist had gone so far as to speculate that his disorder might have been the result
of his eating junk food, particularly cream-filled cakes known as "Twinkies," in excessive amounts.
Klawans, supra, at 60. After trial, the jury found White guilty of voluntary manslaughter and
sentenced White to seven and two-third years in prison. White, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 615. White served only five years and one month of his seven-year sentence. The Late Dan
White, SanFrancisco Examiner, Oct. 22, 1985, at Al, cols. 1, 2. Public outcry against the verdict was
extraordinary, and in part the culmination of a long-standing feeling that mental defenses allowed
cold-blooded killers to receive lenient sentences. See In Defense of ctims, supra note 12, at 21.
215. 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 404, sees. 1-7, at 1592-93.
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and that evidence of mental defect or disorder would not be
admissible to prove the defendant lacked the capacity to form any
mental state, including purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation
2 16
or malice aforethought, necessary as an element of the crime;

(2) specifically repealed the language in Conley as a test of proving
malice, 217 as well as the language of Wolff relating to deliberation

and

premeditation; 218

(3)

attempted

to

abolish

voluntary

intoxication as a defense to any crime requiring purpose, intent,

knowledge, or malice;219 and (4) prohibited experts from testifying
regarding whether the accused actually had the mental state
required as an element of the crine.2 2 °

Senate Bill 54 did provide that evidence of mental illness or
defect and evidence of voluntary intoxication could be introduced
to prove the accused actually lacked the required intent or state of
mind at the time of the offense.221 It was testimony about the
accused's capacity to form the required mental state, not its actual
formation, that was proscribed under the bill.2m
While Senate Bill 54's scope was quite ambitious, the

legislation came too late. By the time of its enactment, Proposition
8, with its prohibition of diminished capacity, was already being

216. Id., sec. 4, at 1592 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a)-(b)).
217. Id., sec. 6, at 1593 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 188). "An awareness of the obligation
to act within the general body of laws regulating society is not included within the definition of
malice." lId
218. 1l, see. 7, at 1593 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 189). "To prove the killing was
deliberate and premeditated, it shall not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and
meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his or her acL" IL
219. Id., sec. 2, at 1592 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(a)-(c)).
220. Id., sec. 5, at 1593 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 29).
221. Id., sec. 2, at 1592 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(b)); id., see. 4, at 1592 (enacting
CAL. PENAL CODE § 28).
222. On this point Senate Bill 54 seemed to create a distinction of words. Cases had used the
term "diminished capacity" to describe the impaired state of mind of the accused at the time of
offense. Psychiatrists often based their conclusions on pre-offense and post-offense information.
Under Senate Bill 54, both types of information would be probative of the accused's actual lack of
mental state. See Seibert, Admissibility of PsychiatricTestimony in Guilt Phase of BifurcatedTrials:
What's Left After the Reforms of the Diminished Capacity Defense, 16 PAC. LJ.305 (1984) (an
excellent analysis of Senate Bill 54); Morse & Cohen, Diminished Capacity, 2 CAL. LAW, June,
1986, at 24-26 (discussion of the purposes of the drafters of Senate Bill 54 by authors who were
legislative staff members and assisted in drafting Senate Bill 54).
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circulated to obtain enough signatures to place it on the ballot.223
Even if Senate Bill 54 had come earlier, it is doubtful that it would
have satisfied the supporters of Proposition 8. From the law and
order perspective, Senate Bill 54 had some noticeable problems; the
measure did not return California to the M'Naghten standard, and
it left open the mental impairment defense by allowing introduction
of evidence that the accused lacked the required intent, purpose,
knowledge, or malice. 4 Many would say, quite incorrectly, that
Senate Bill 54 had only forced a name change from "diminished
capacity" to "diminished actuality." '
One defense attorney
went so far as to argue that Senate Bill 54 had expanded mental
defenses to general intent crimes, gloating that it was a "bonanza"
for the defense. 6
Proposition 8 added section 25(a) to the California Penal Code,
abolishing the diminished capacity defense and restoring the
M'Naghten test:2 7
The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal
action, as well as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an
accused person's intoxication, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect
shall not be admissible to show or negate capacity to form the particular

223.

Senate Bill 54 was signed by the Governor and filed with the Secretary of State on

September 10, 1981. 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 404, sec. 1-7, at 1591-93. Proposition 8 was filed with the
Secretary of State on August 7,1981 and thereafter was circulated. See Petitioner's Petition for a Writ
of Prohibition and Mandate at 2, Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 641 P.2d 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100

(1982) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal). See infra, notes 225-236 and accompanying text
(discussing Proposition 8's diminished capacity provisions).
224.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a) (West 1983).

225. The author first heard the term "diminished actuality" used by Charles Sevilla at the June
19, 1982 seminar sponsored by C.E.B. on Proposition 8, held at the University of California, Los
Angeles.
226. See Sevilla, SB 54: The Death and the Re-Birth of Diminished Capacity in California,9
CAL. A=rY. CriM. JUSmTCE FoRUM, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 1. Sevilla's comments would be used as
evidence that Proposition 8 was needed to enact a "true" abolition of diminished capacity. See
Analysis of Proposition8, supra,note 12, at 22-23; Kopp, The Realities of Hictim's Bill of Rights,
San Francisco Recorder, May 25, 1982 at 1,9, col. 6, 10, col. 1. See also 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 893,
sec. 3, at 3318 (amending section 28(a) to limit its application to specific intent crimes). See infra,
note 239 (setting forth section 28(a)).
227. See supra notes 156-185 and accompanying text (discussing the M'Naghten test).
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other mental
purpose, intent, motive, malice aforethought, knowledge, or
22 8
charged.
crime
the
of
commission
the
for
state required

Section 25(c) was also added, stating: "Notwithstanding the
foregoing, evidence of diminished capacity or of a mental disorder
may be considered by the court only at the time of
sentencing. -1229
Reading sections 25(a) and (c) together, one might conclude
that mental defenses were no longer available to offenses requiring
specific intent, malice, or knowledge. Diminished capacity was now
restricted to the sentencing phase. However, the Attorney General's
Office in their Guide to Proposition8,230 issued the day after the
election, offered a completely different conclusion." First, it
found that Proposition 8 and Senate Bill 54 were not in conflict;
rather that they were complementary to one another. 232 Finding
both provisions operative, the Attorney General then reasoned that
evidence of a mental illness or mental defect could still be offered
as a defense to negate proof that the accused actually formed the
required state of mind; Proposition 8 and Senate Bill 54 prohibited
evidence of the accused's capacity to form the mens rea.233
The Attorney General also did not find incongruity to the
reasoning in section 25(c) limiting the court's consideration of
diminished capacity evidence to the time of sentencing: "The
limitation is on 'the court' rather than the trier of fact ... .,,~234
Thus, the trier of fact could still hear evidence of lack of specific
intent due to mental disorder when specific intent was at issue at
the guilt phase of a trial.2 3 The Attorney General's interpretation
is not surprising; any other interpretation would have made it

228. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (enacted by Proposition 8).
229. Id § 25(c) (enacted by Proposition 8).
230. Attorney General's Guide, supra note 47.
231. Id at 258-61.
232. See id. at 258 (stating that "[t]he new Penal Code Section 25 does not appear to contradict
Section 28.... Therefore, the initiative's diminished capacity provision does not require any change
from those measures taken to implement Section 28").
233. Id. at 258.
234. Id. at 260.
235. Id,
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impossible to present any mental defense other than insanity at the
guilt phase of a trial, irrespective of an accused's inability to have
formed the required state of mind. This would have had the effect
of imposing a strict liability test where acts alone, exclusive of
mens rea, are judged. Read that way, sections 25(a) and (c) would
have been found in violation of due process
probably 36
2
standards.
The Attorney General's interpretation has been accepted by the
courts."3 7 Although it probably saved sections 25(a) and (c) from
constitutional attack, this interpretation largely reduces them to
surplusage; the sections add no additional restrictions on mental
defenses than those that already existed under Senate Bill 54.
Sections 25(a) and (c) do, however, stand as an important public
of the
policy statement disfavoring the use and 23extension
8
cases.
criminal
in
defenses
diminished capacity
What, then, remains of the diminished capacity defense after
Senate Bill 54 and Proposition 8? In homicide cases, where such
a defense is most often used, the effect has been profound.
For a time, it appeared that the seemingly-contradictory
language of Penal Code section 28(a) might allow for the type of
defenses allowed in Conley 3 1 or Wof'1 4° if the evidence of
impairment was addressed to the accused's actual lack of malice or
to the quality of the accused's premeditation and deliberation at the
time of the offense.2 4' In fact, in People v. Molina,24 the

236. People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318,326 n.6, 583 P.2d 1308, 1315 n.6, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265,
271 n.6 (1978). See Krausz, The Relevance of Innocence:Proposition8 and the DiminishedCapacity
Law, 71 CAF. L. REV. 1197, 1203-04 (1984).
237. People v. Molina, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 1172 n.1, 249 Cal. Rptr. 273, 275 n.1 (1988);
People v. Whitler, 171 Cal. App. 3d 337,341-42,214 Cal. Rptr. 610, 613 (1985); id., 171 Cal. App.
3d at 342,214 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (Sims, J., concurring); People v. Jackson, 152 Cal. App. 3d 961,968,
199 Cal. Rptr. 848, 852 (1984).
238. People v. Spurlin, 156 Cal. App. 3d 119, 128, 202 Cal. Rptr. 663, 668-69 (1984).
239. People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310,411 P.2d 911,49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966). See supra notes
196-204 and accompanying text (discussing the Conley decision).
240. People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795,394 P.2d 959,40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964). See supra notes
194-195 and accompanying text (discussing the Wo/ffdecision).
241. California Penal Code section 28(a) states in part:
Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible solely on the
issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a required specific intent,
premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime
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Second District Court of Appeal of California suggested that malice

retained the meaning given to it in Conley and was actually a
concept larger than the mere intent to kill.243 In Molina, the court
of appeal came to the conclusion that although a specific intent to
kill may have been found, if there was an "actual" lack of malice,
the offense could be reduced to voluntary manslaughter absent

evidence of a sudden quarrel, sufficient provocation, or imperfect
self-defense. 2"

In December of 1991, the Supreme Court of California spoke
definitively to the issue raised in Molina, and put an end to
speculation that the defenses allowed in Conley or Woff remained
viable. The court spoke in two ways: first, the court issued its
opinion in People v. Saille;2 45 second, the

court ordered

publication of People v. Bobo,246 a Third District Court of Appeal
decision reaching a completely different result than Molina.
The Supreme Court of California's decision in Saille involved
a heavily intoxicated person who, after having been refused service,
returned to a bar with a rifle with the intent to shoot the
bartender.2 47 A struggle ensued and the gun discharged, killing a

patron. 24' The trial court instructed the jury that voluntary
intoxication could be considered in determining whether the
accused had a specific intent to kill.24 9 On appeal, the defense

is charged.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a) (West 1991).
242. 202 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 249 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1988). In Molina, a mother, hearing
hallucinatory voices, stabbed her baby boy to death. I& at 1171, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
243. Id. at 1173-75, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 275-76.
244. Id. at 1175-76, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77.
245. 54 Cal. 3d 1103, 820 P.2d 588, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (1991).
246. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (1991) (ordering publication of People v. Bobo, 229 Cal. App. 3d
1417,271 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1990) pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 976(d) and 978(c)). In
Bobo the accused stabbed her children and set fire to the apartment with herself in it. Bobo, 229 Cal.
App. 3d 1417, 1423, 271 Cal. Rptr. 277, 281. Both court and defense psychiatrists diagnosed her as
a paranoid schizophrenic with auditory hallucinations telling her that her children would be killed.
Id. at 1427-33, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 282-86. The defense claimed her condition negated malice and her
ability to premeditate and deliberate. Md.at 1434, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 286. She was found guilty of first
degree murder and later found sane. Id. at 1422, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 279. The trial court refused a
voluntary manslaughter instruction. Id. at 1436, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
247. Saille, 54 Cal. 3d at 1108, 820 P.2d at 590, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366.
248. Id.
249. Id
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claimed that the instruction was inadequate because it did not state
that voluntary intoxication could negate malice and reduce the
offense to voluntary manslaughter." Rejecting this argument, the
Supreme Court of California found that Senate Bill 54's
amendment to California Penal Code section 188 had stripped away
the elaboration that had been given to the definition of malice by
cases such as Conley and Poddar. 1 As a result, "once the trier
of fact finds a deliberate intention unlawfully to kill, no other
mental state need be shown to establish malice afterthought.' 2
Additionally, Senate Bill 54's amendment to California Penal Code
section 188 eliminated the basis for non-statutory manslaughter
recognized in the Conley decision."
The Saille decision also dealt with a defense contention that the
trial court should have instructed sua sponte that voluntary
intoxication could be considered in deciding whether there was
deliberation and premeditation." 4 The court acknowledged that
evidence of intoxication was relevant to the issue of the actual
premeditation and deliberation, and held that a court should give
"pinpoint" instructions on this matter ifrequested by the defense
in cases where evidence is presented suggesting a reasonable doubt

250. Id.
251. Id. California Penal Code section 188 originally read:
Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate
intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no
considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show
an abandoned and malignant heart.
1850 Cal. Stat ch. 99, sec. 20-21, at 231, as amended by 1856 Cal. Stat. ch. 139, see. 2, at 219
(enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 188). Senate Bill 54 added the following language to section 188:
When it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with
express or implied malice as defined above, no other mental state need be shown to
establish the mental state of malice aforethought. An awareness of the obligation to act
within the general body of laws regulating society is not included within the definition of
malice.
1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 404, sec. 6, at 1593 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 188). The second sentence
of this paragraph added by Senate Bill 54 was amended in 1982 to read: "Neither an awareness of
the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such
awareness is included within the definition of malice." 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 893, sec. 4, at 3318
(amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 188).
252. Saille, 54 Cal. 3d at 1113, 820 P.2d at 594, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 370.
253. Id See Conley, 64 Cal. 2d at 319, 411 P.2d at 917, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
254. Saille, 54 Cal. 3d at 1117-20, 820 P.2d at 596-99, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372-75.
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about premeditation and deliberation. 5 According to the court
in Saille, sua sponte instructions are required only for recognized
defenses, and abolition of the diminished capacity defense thereby
eliminated the necessity of sua sponte instructions where such a
defense was interposed." 6
Diminished capacity law also changed on the issue of
premeditation and deliberation in the proof of first degree murder.
In People v. Stress,"' the Fourth District Court of Appeals of
California addressed the status of the diminished capacity defense
formulated in the Wolff case.Y On appeal from his conviction
for first degree murder, Stress claimed the trial court's finding of
premeditation and deliberation was in error. 9 The defense
argued that, despite Senate Bill 54's amendment to California Penal
Code section 188," 0 premeditation and deliberation requires
careful thought and weighing of the consequences. 61 According
to the defense, premeditation and deliberation are measured in the
extent of reflection, and cannot be said to have occurred unless a
choice to kill is made with the consequences in mind.2 62 Given
mental condition, this type of reflection was not
the accused's
263
possible.
The court of appeal rejected the defense's interpretation, stating
264
that this formulation was simply Wolff in another form.

255. Id. at 1120, 820 P.2d at 598-99, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374-75.
256. laR
257. 205 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 252 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1988).
258. I& at 1262, 1268-71,252 Cal. Rptr. at 914,918-20. Stress, obsessed by the possibility of
his son being drafted into the Army, believed that there was a conspiracy to keep professional
athletes out of the service and spent years attempting to prove it. Id. at 1262-67, 252 Cal. Rptr. at
914-15. Desperate to get attention, Stress axed his wife to death. I&. at 1262, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
Psychiatrists variously described Stress as delusional, paranoid, and psychotic. Id. at 1264-67, 252
Cal. Rptr. at 915-17. Stress was found guilty in a non-jury trial of first degree murder, the court also
found Stress to be sane. IM.at 261-62, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 914. See supra note 187 and accompanying
text (discussing the Wolffdecision).
259. Stress, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1268-69, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 918-19.
260. See 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 404, sec. 6, at 1593 (amending CAl. PENAL CODE § 188). See also
supra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing Senate Bill 54's revision to section 188).
261. Stress, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1268-71, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 918-20.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1270, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
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According to the court of appeal, the effect of Senate Bill 54 and
Proposition 8 was to eliminate the requirement of meaningful and
mature reflection for premeditation and deliberation.265 The court
of appeal found that the inquiry under the revised California Penal
Code section 188 and Proposition 8 is whether premeditation and
deliberation occurred, not whether it was the product of a mental
impairment.2 " In other words, after Senate Bill 54 and
Proposition 8, California Penal Code section 188 would allow
evidence of mental state only to prove that premeditation and
deliberation did not take place, not that premeditation and
deliberation were influenced by a mental illness.
With Saille, Bobo and Stress in place, California's law on
mental impairment has been reduced to the barest level, to what
some commentators call a "strict mens rea test." 267 Under the
current interpretation of diminished capacity, evidence of mental
illness, impairment, or defect is only available to prove the accused
lacked a specific intent, did not premeditate or deliberate, or did
not form some other mental state required for the crime. In nonhomicide cases, Senate Bill 54 and Proposition 8 might make little
difference, since in non-homicide cases the question has always
been whether the accused has a specific intent to commit a
particular crime.'" But inhomicide cases, Saille, Bobo and Stress
mean that juries are restricted to the narrow issue of whether there
was premeditation or deliberation in forming the intent to kill.
Faced with these constraints, juries will likely return first and
265. Id. at 1270-71, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
266. Id.The Stress court stated:
A finding of deliberation and premeditation is not negated by evidence that a defendants
mental condition was abnormal or his perceptions of reality delusional unless those
conditions resulted in a failure to plan or weigh considerations for and against the
proposed action. The mental process necessary for a fimding of deliberation and

premeditation is not dependent on the motivation for the act. Nor is the necessary process
lacking when considerations reflected on by the defendant were the product of mental
disease or defect.
Id
267. Seibert, supra note 222, at 307.
268. The changes to California Penal Code section 188 made by Senate Bill 54 may have
confined evidence of diminished capacity to the issue of the actual state of mind, rather than the
capacity to form the specific intent; however, such a distinction is usually a matter of the way the
question is phrased for the expert.
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second degree murder verdicts in cases of extreme mental
disability, such as Stress, Molina and Bobo. Mental defenses will
largely be confined to the delusional killer who, in all likelihood,
will be found insane. However, because the length of 269a
commitment is based on the offense found to be true,
defendants with diminished mental capacity will be confined for
longer periods than if they had been found guilty of manslaughter.
Many such defendants, such as the accused in Bobo, who are
unable to utilize diminished capacity as a defense and are unable
to prove they were insane at the time the act was committed
because of the stringent M'Naghten test 2 1 will be warehoused
for life terms in state prisons. These defendants may be the most
severely affected victims of Proposition 8.

IV. ENHANCEMENT OF PRISON TERMS
In 1977 the Legislature enacted the Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act (U.D.S.A.),2 71 a comprehensive and complex
scheme applicable to most crimes and designed to replace
California's indeterminate sentencing law. A product of a coalition
of liberals and conservatives dissatisfied for different reasons with
indeterminate sentencing, the U.D.S.A. came under attack even
before its effective date because of its short sentences27 2 and its

269. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.5(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
270. See supranotes 172-181 and accompanying text (discussing California's imposition of the
M'Naghten standard for proving insanity in criminal cases).
271. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139, at 5061 (enacting California's Uniform Determinate Sentencing
Act).
272. See 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139, sec. 133, at 5098 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 190)
(providing that second degree murder could be punishable by a five-year sentence). See also 1977
Cal. Stat. ch. 316, sec. 4, at 1256 (repealing this version of California Penal Code section 190).
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limitations on enhancements2 73 and consecutive sentences.274
Although the legislature lengthened many of the sentences and rewrote some of the limitations on terms,275 the conservative critics
of the U.D.S.A. were not mollified.
Proposition 8 contained two sections that would lengthen
sentences. One, entitled "Habitual Criminals," added Section 667
to the Penal Code and required five-year enhancements for each
prior serious felony conviction when a defendant suffered a new
conviction.276 The other, entitled "Use of Prior Convictions,"
added section 28(f) to article I of the California Constitution, and
included language that would become the basis for nullifying the
prior felony conviction enhancements
limitation on the number of
2 77
receive.
could
a defendant
A. Penal Code Section 667
Penal Code Section 667 requires that any person convicted of
a serious felony, as defined in California Penal Code section
1192:7278 (also added by Proposition 8) "shall receive, in

273. See 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139, sec. 273, at 5140 (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1)
(placing restrictions on sentencing enhancements)). See also 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 165, sec. 17, at 619
(amending and renumbering California Penal Code section 1170(a)(1)).
274. See 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139, sec. 273, at 5140 (adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1a)
(placing limitation on the number of years a court can impose for consecutive sentence). See also
1977 Cal. Stat ch. 165, see. 17, at 649 (Tenumbering and amending California Penal Code section
1170(a)(1)). The U.D.SA. also repealed the provision of the California Penal Code relating to life
imprisonment for habitual criminals. 1976 Cal. Stats. ch. 1139, sec. 261.5, at 5136 (repealing CAL.
PENAL CODE § 644).
275. See 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 165, sees. 1-95, at 639-79 (enacting revisions to the U.D.S.A.). See
also Review of Selected 1977 CaliforniaLegislation, 9 PAC. U. 469, 469-75 (1978) (delineating
changes to the U.D.S.A. by the 1977 amendments).
276. CAL PENAL CODE § 667 (enacted by Proposition 8).
277. CAL. CoNsT. art I, § 28(f) (enacted by Proposition 8) (West Supp. 1992). Whether article
I, section 28(f) was so intended is open to question. See infra, notes 311-318 and accompanying text
(discussing section 28(f)).
278. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (defining "serious felony" as those felonies listed in
subdivision (c) of California Penal Code section 1192.7). Section 1192.7 enumerates 24 felonies
ranging from offenses such as rape, murder and arson to selling drugs to minors. AL § 1192.7(c).
Included also in the serious felony category were the attempts to do any of the offenses listed in
section 1192.7. Id Additionally, some offenses which were not previously specifically codified
crimes, such as residential burglary and any felony where a deadly or dangerous weapon was used,
were listed. Id. The complete list of serious felonies listed in section 1192.7(c) is as follows: (1)
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addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present
offense, a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on
charges brought and tried separately. The terms of the present
offense and each enhancement shall run consecutively." 279
In addition to the five-year enhancement, section 667 had other
features: (1) Section 667 requiredeach enhancement to be stacked
on consecutively to the new charge or to any other enhancement;
(2) unlike the U.D.S.A. prior enhancements, section 667 contained
no "wash-out" period whereby the prior felony conviction could
no longer be utilized to enhance a sentence because of the age of
the conviction--no matter how ancient, the prior serious felony
conviction could be pled, proven and used to enhance; 280 (3)
section 667 did not require, as did the U.D.S.A., that the defendant
had served time in prison on the prior convictions; 21 (4) if other

Murder or voluntary manslaughter, (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force, violence, duress,
menace, or threat of great bodily injury on the victim or another person; (5) lewd acts upon a child
under 14; (6) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; (7)
any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in state prison for life; (8) any felony in which the
defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice or any felony in which
the defendant uses a firearm; (9) attempted murder, (10) assault with intent to commit rape or
robbery; (11) assault by a life prisoner on a non-inmate; (12) assault with a deadly weapon instrument
on a peace officer, (13) assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate; (14) arson; (15) exploding a
destructive device or an explosive with intent to injure; (16) exploding a destructive device or any
explosive causing great bodily injury; (17) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent
to commit murder, (18) burglary of a residence; (19) robbery; (20) kidnapping; (21) taldng of a
hostage by a state prisoner, (22) attempt to commit a felony punishable by death or imprisonment
for life; (23) any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon; (24)
selling, furnishing, administering, or providing heroin, cocaine, or PCP to a minor, (25) any attempt
to commit a crime listed above other than an assault; (26) any felony offense of driving under the
influence of alcohol, drugs, narcotics, or any other intoxicating substances, or combination thereof.
CAL PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (enacted by Proposition 8).
279. Id. § 667 (enacted by Proposition 8). See id § 1192.7(c) (enacted by Proposition 8)
(defining serious felonies for purposes of California Penal Code section 667).
280. Proposition 8's supporters were not apologetic about section 667's lack of a "wash-out"
period-arguably one of the Proposition's harshest provisions-allowing prosecutors to charge prior
convictions that were 20, 30 or even 40 years old. Assembly Republicans stated: "We respectfully
submit that to a victim of a violent crime [residential burglary?] the injuries and humiliations suffered
are never 'old' or 'stale."' In Defense of Victims, supra note 12, at 30.
281. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (enacted by Proposition 8). The focus here on prior
convictions, as opposed to prior prison terms, was borne out of a conclusion that the U.D.S.A.'s
enhancements were inadequate deterrents against recidivism. The prior prison term enhancement in
the U.D.S.A. applied to the small class of offenders who actually were incarcerated in prison. As the
Assembly Republicans on the Committee on Criminal Justice wrote in their defense of Proposition
8:
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provisions of law resulted in a longer sentence for a defendant,
section 667 became inoperative;282 (5) section 667 required each
serious felony prior to have been brought and tried separately when
stacked with other serious felony priors.28 3
With section 667's lengthy enhancement and its lack of washout time, trial judges predictably attempted to strike prior
convictions where they felt the priors would result in inequitable
sentences. The question of the judiciary's authority to do this in the
face of section 667's mandatory language284 reached the Supreme
Court of California in People v. Fritz.215 In Fritz, the court
affirmed the trial court's power to strike serious felony prior
' 26
convictions, despite section 667's use of the word "shall. 1
Shortly after the court handed down its decision in Fritz, the
Legislature amended section 667 to overrule Fritz and to deny
judges authority to strike prior convictions.8 7
Section 667 set off an enormous amount of appellate litigation.
For example, there was confusion whether the double-the-base-term
limitation of the U.D.S.A.288 applied to prior convictions under
section 667. Shortly after Proposition 8's passage, the California
Legislature amended section 1170.1(g) to exclude California Penal
Code section 667.5 prior violent convictions from the doublethe-base-term rule.290 In 1985, the Supreme Court of California
in People v. Jackson29 ' held that the clear intent of Proposition

Out of 180,000 persons arrested for felonies in 1980, only 6.7% ever went to prison, or
about 12,600. The rest were given probation, county jail, diversion, or simply released.
County prior prison terms for career criminals is therefore a limited endeavor with little
true impact or serious crime.

In Defense of Trctims, supra note 12, at 30.
282.
283.
284.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (enacted by Proposition 8).
IL § 667(a) (enacted by Proposition 8).
Penal Code section 667 provides that "[a]ny person convicted of a serious felony ...

shal receive ...

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
with id §
290.
291.
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a five-year enhancement. . . ." Id. § 667 (West 1983).

40 Cal. 3d 227, 707 P.2d 833, 219 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1985).
Id. at 230-31, 707 P.2d at 834-35, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 461-62.
1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 85, sees. 2-4, at 211-12 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 667).
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(g) (West 1982).
Compare id. § 667.5 (West 1982) (sentencing enhancements for prior violent felonies)
667 (West 1983) (sentencing enhancements for prior serious felonies).
1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 1551, sec. 1.5, at 6048-49 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(g)).
37 Cal. 3d 826, 694 P.2d 736, 210 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1985).
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8 was to exclude section 667 serious felony enhancements from
section 1170.1(g)'s double-the-base-term restriction.2 92

Another question arises under section 667--could juvenile court
adjudications count as serious felony prior convictions? Article I,
section 28(f) states that any prior conviction arising from any
criminal proceeding, adult or juvenile, could be used for
enhancement purposes. 293 The court of appeal in People v.
West294 answered that juvenile court adjudications could not be
used, because juvenile wardship proceedings are not criminal in
nature, and neither the initiative nor the ballot pamphlet indicated
a clear intent to include
such adjudications within the reach of
295
article I, section 28(f).
A third issue raised by the application of Penal Code section
667 was the meaning of the phrase "brought and tried
separately. ' 296 Could prior serious felonies be considered
separate prior convictions if they were sentenced together? The
Supreme Court of California addressed this issue in In re
Harris,297 holding that cases could be considered "brought and
tried separately" if "the underlying proceedings . . . have been
formally distinct, from filing to the adjudication of guilt."298
Cases that do not begin with the same complaint, although later

292. Id. at 839, 694 P.2d at 743,210 Cal. Rptr. at 631. The court also noted: "Proposition 8's
failure to amend section 1170.1, subdivision (g) appears to be a draftsman's oversight." Id at 838
n.15, 694 P.2d at 743 n.15, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 63 n.15. Since the Jackson decision, the legislature has
amended Penal Code section 1170.1(g) to specifically include enhancements imposed pursuant to
section 667. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(g) (West Supp. 1991).
293. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(t) (enacted by Proposition 8).
294. 154 Cal. App. 3d 100, 201 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1984). See In re Kenneth H., 33 Cal. 3d 616,
619 n.3, 659 P.2d 1156, 1158 n.3, 189 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 n.3 (1983) (agreeing with West that
juvenile adjudications are not felony priors). However, cases in which juveniles have been tried as
adults can provide the basis for an enhancement. People v. Jacob, 174 Cal. App. 3d 1166, 1171,220
Cal. Rptr. 520, 523 (1985); People v. Blankenship, 167 Cal. App. 3d 840, 853, 213 Cal. Rptr. 666,
674-75 (1985) (out-of-state prior where juvenile was tried as an adult used for enhancement
purposes).
295. West, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 108-09, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 68-69.
296. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (enacted by Proposition 8) (requiring "'afive-year
enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately" (emphasis
added)).
297. 49 Cal. 3d 131,775 P.2d 1057, 260 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1989).
298. Id. at 135-37, 775 P.2d 1057, 1060, 260 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291-92.
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consolidated, are not "brought and tried separately" and cannot be
the cause of individually separate enhancements. 299
Harriswill probably not be dispositive of this issue. Courts will
undoubtedly struggle with the various permutations of prior
convictions that resulted from cases which were joined and
thereafter severed.
A fourth question created by section 667 relates to how the
prosecution proved a "residential burglary" as a serious felony.
Prior to 1982, no separate section existed in the Penal Code for
residential burglary." 0 Often, second degree burglary pleas were
taken in cases involving residences. Consequently, prior convictions
of either first or second degree burglary did not by themselves
include the adjudicable elements of residential burglary normally
required to prove a prior conviction."' Trial and appellate courts
came to conflicting results on what sort of documentation was
sufficient to prove a burglary was residential in character; some
appellate courts allowed probation reports or the information to
prove the residential character of the burglary, 3" while other
the
appellate courts held that the trial court could not go behind
303
unadjudicated element to prove the burglary was residential.
34
The Supreme Court of California, in People v. Alfaro, 0
attempted to state a uniform rule in this area by holding that the
residential character of a burglary conviction must be established
by the judgment of conviction and matters necessarily adjudicated
by -that judgment; going behind the record was impermissible. 0 5
However, two years later, the Supreme Court of California in
People v. Guerrero3 6 reversed its decision in Alfaro, holding that

299. Id.
300. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 460 (West 1992) (first degree burglary includes but does not
require burglary of "an inhabited dwelling").
301. People v. Jackson, 37 Cal. 3d 826, 834-35, 694 P.2d 736, 738-40, 210 Cal. Rptr. 623,
627-28 (1985); People v. Crowson, 33 Cal. 3d 623, 632-35, 190 Cal. Rptr. 165, 169-70, 660 P.2d
389, 395 (1983).
302. People v. Dean, 161 Cal. App. 3d 493, 502, 207 Cal. Rptr. 688, 694 (1984); People v.
Longinetti, 164 Cal. App. 3d 704, 706, 210 Cal. Rptr. 729, 730 (1985).
303. People v. Lee, 150 Cal. App. 3d 455, 458-59, 197 Cal. Rptr. 766, 768 (1984).
304. 42 Cal. 3d 627, 724 P.2d 1154,230 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1986).
305. Id. at 632-37, 724 P.2d at 1157-60, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 132-35.
306. 44 Cal. 3d 343, 748 P.2d 1150, 243 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1988).
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the trial court could look beyond the judgment to the entire

record.

7

Since Guerrero, the courts of appeal have struggled to

define what part of the record is admissible to show whether a

particular conviction was a residential burglary. Clearly, plea
admissions' 8 and the preliminary hearing or trial transcript can
be introduced; 30 9 other data, such as probation reports, are open

to question.3 10 Out-of-state convictions for residential burglaries,
as well as out-of-state convictions for what purportedly are other
serious prior felony convictions311 for section 667 purposes, also
present great problems, as courts search the available records to
determine whether the adjudicable elements of the out-of-state
offense match those of offenses listed in section 1192.7.312
B. California Constitution, Article 1, Section 28(t)
When Proposition 8 was before the voters, the office of the
Legislative Analyst seemed to be the only party to understand that
the addition of section 28(f) to article I of the California
Constitution, 313 as well as the addition of Penal Code section
667,314 would lengthen sentences. In their analysis in the Voters'
Pamphlet, the Legislative Analyst pointed out:

307. L at 345-56, 748 P.2d at 1150-56, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 688-96.
308. People v. Garcia, 216 Cal. App. 3d 233, 236-37, 264 Cal. Rptr. 662, 664-65 (1989).
309. People v. Castellanos, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1163, 1173-74,269 Cal. Rptr. 93,99-100 (1990).
310. Compare People v. Garcia, 216 Cal. App. 3d 233, 237, 264 Cal. Rptr. 662, 665 (1989)
(admitting probation report) with People v. Williams, 222 Cal. App. 3d 911,917, 272 Cal. Rptr. 212,
216 (1990) (excluding probation report as multiple hearsay).
311. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (West 1992) (defining serious prior felony convictions
for purposes of enhancement); id § 1192.7(c) (West 1992) (defining serious felony).
312. People v. Reynolds, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1528, 1532-36,284 Cal. Rptr. 356,359-60 (1991);
People v. Guzman, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1302, 1309, 275 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859 (1990) (depublished
opinion).
313. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(f) (enacted by Proposition 8). Section 28(f) states that "[a]ny
prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding ... shall subsequently be used
without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal
proceeding....- Id. (emphasis added).
314. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (enacted by Proposition 8). See supra notes 276-291 and
accompanying text (discussing Penal Code section 667's impact on sentence lengths).
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Longer Prison Terms. Under existing law, a prison sentence can be
increased from what it otherwise would be by from one to ten years,
depending on the crime, if the convicted person has served prior prison
terms, and a life sentence can be given to certain repeat
offenders....
This measure includes two provisions that would increase prison
sentences for persons convicted of specified felonies. First, upon a
second or subsequent conviction for one of these felonies, the defendant
could receive, on top of his or her sentence, an additional five-year
prison term for each such prior conviction, regardless of the sentence
imposed for the prior conviction.... Second, any prior felony could be
315
used without limitation in calculating longer prison terms.

Even after Proposition 8 went into effect, very few people
seemed to be aware that the language contained in article I, section
28(f) could affect the limitation on enhancements on prior
convictions for offenses not listed as serious felonies in Proposition
8.316 However, on the strength of the Legislative Analyst's
statement, several courts of appeal, 31 7 and ultimately the Supreme
Court of California, found that article I, section 28(f) abrogated the
double-the-base-term limi 1i on prior prison term enhancements

315. Legislative Analyst of California, Analysis, in CAL. BALLoT PAMPHLET, supra note 7, at
54-55 (emphasis in original).
316. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (enacted by Proposition 8) (requiring that upon conviction
of a serious felony, a five-year enhancement be imposed for each prior conviction); id. § 1192.7
(enacted by Proposition 8) (defining serious felony). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West
1982) (definition of violent felony). One writer did think that Proposition 8 might affect the five-year
"wash-out" rule for non-violent felonies. See S.F. Public Defenders Office, Hitting the Ground
Running: Some PracticalStrategies for Life After Gann, printed in Criminal Practice After
Proposition8, at 385 (May 1982) (copy on file at PacificLaw Journal).See also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 667.5(b) (West 1982) (providing that where the current offense was a non-violent felony, no
additional sentence could be imposed for prison terms served prior to five years before the current
offense). However, the Court of Appeal of California ruled that section 28(f) was inapplicable to the
five-year 'wash-out" rule. People v. Maid, 161 Cal. App. 3d 697, 700, 207 Cal. Rptr. 777, 778-79
(1984).
317. People v. Doane, 200 Cal. App. 3d 852, 868, 246 Cal. Rptr. 366, 375 (1988); People v.
Poole, 168 Cal. App. 3d 516, 524,214 Cal. Rptr. 502,506 (1985); People v. Hall, 168 Cal. App. 3d
624, 630, 214 Cal. Rptr. 289, 294 (1985).
318. Under the U.D.S.A., an enhancement for a prior prison sentence would be reduced to the
extent necessary to comply with the double-the-base-term rule. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (g) (West
Supp. 1992).
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for the commission of violent felonies under Penal Code section
667.5.319

A remaining issue in this area is whether section 28(f) will
have other effects on both Proposition 8 and non-Proposition 8
priors, such
as the repeated use of the same prior on consecutive
320
terms.
C. Impact of Penal Code Section 667 and Section 28() on Jury
Trials and Prison Terms
Most courthouse observers believe that Proposition 8's five-year
prior conviction enhancement strengthened the prosecutor's
leverage in the plea bargaining arena. Defendants found themselves
less able to afford the risk of a jury trial and were compelled to
bargain for as much leniency as possible. The section 667
enhancements also made defendants willing to accept state prison
terms that in the period before Proposition 8 simply would have
been unacceptable.
The elimination of the double-the-base-term rule for sections
667 and 667.5 prior convictions has only marginally affected plea
bargains, jury trials, and the length of prison sentences. Ordinarily,
a defendant has a possible sentence, if convicted, of a year or two,
and with good-time/work-time credits, an actual sentence of six
months or a year in prison. Thus, the elimination of the double-thebase-term rule is unlikely to ever be much of a factor in a

319. People v. Prather, 50 Cal. 3d 428, 787 P.2d 1012, 267 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990). See 1990
Cal. Stat. ch. 835, sec. 1, at 3181 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(g) to conform to the
Pratherdecision). See also People v. Jackson, 37 Cal. 3d 826,839,694 P.2d 736,743,210 Cal. Rptr.
623, 630 (1985) (holding that the clear intent of Proposition 8 was to exclude section 667 serious
felony enhancements from section 1170.1(g)'s double-the-base-term restriction). In reaching their
decision in Jackson, the court apparently did not rely on article 1,section 28: "We find the meaning
of the constitutional provision uncertain, but agree that section 667 was intended to impose an
enhancement unlimited by the double base term rule." l at 837, 694 P.2d at 743, 210 Cal. Rptr.
at 630.
320. See People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 90, 679 P.2d 1, 8-9, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 574-76
(1984) (prior conviction enhancements "go to the nature of the offender," not to the offense; such
enhancements have nothing to do with particular counts, but since they are related to the offender,
are added only once as a step in arriving at the aggregate sentence). It is possible, however, that
attempts will be made to overrule TasselU.
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defendant's calculation of the risk of a jury trial or of a district
attorney's notion of an appropriate sentence.
There is, however, inconclusive data to support the perception
that Proposition 8 enhancements themselves have caused a decline
in felony jury trials or an increase in prison commitments.
Unfortunately, there seems to be no readily available evidence to
measure the effect of any prior enhancement on the length of a
state prison sentence. A review of the number of jury trials (Figure
2)321 and prison commitments (Figure 3) in the years immediately
before and following Proposition 8's passage clearly demonstrates
that jury trials are relatively less frequent and prison commitments
more frequent. The significance of this fact is open to varying
interpretations.

321. Figure 2, infra, sets forth the Judicial Council data on superior court jury trials,
dispositions, and the percentage that jury trials represent of all dispositions during the years 19771978 through 1989-1990.
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FIGURE 2
IN CALIFORNIA
TRIALS
JURY
FELONY

22

%+ - %
Differences

Fiscal Years

Number of
Jury Trials

Number of
Dispositions

%

1977-78

4,914

48,986

10.03

1978-79

4,472

49,264

9.1

-.93

1979-80

4,439

51,190

8.7

-.4

1980-81

4,544

58,312

7.8

-.9

1981-82

4,900

60,998

8.0

+.2

1982-83

4,810

67,261

7.2

-.8

1983-84

4,404

66,534

6.6

-.6

1984-85

4,184

74,432

5.6

-1.

1985-86

4,202

87,784

4.8

-.8

1986-87

4,627

98,734

4.7

-.1

1987-88

5,138

111,120

4.6

-.1

1988-89

5,365

124,231

4.3

-.3

1989-90

5,485

140,294

3.9

-.4

During the years depicted in Figure 2, jury trials, as a
percentage of dispositions in the superior court, consistently
declined with the exception of one year. In the four fiscal years
before Proposition 8's passage (1977-1978 to 1981-1982) the
annual percentage difference was -.51; in the four years after
Proposition 8 the annual percentage difference was -.8. However,
it would be difficult to ascribe this difference to any one factor
arising from Proposition 8. Similarly, in terms of state prison

322. These computations have been made by the author from Judicial Council Annual Reports
for the years set forth in Figure 2. The information has been collected and analyzed in the Annual
Report of the San Francisco Public Defender, Vol. 2, at 1-12.
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commitments, as Figure 3, infia, shows, there were increases
before and after Proposition 8; but there were no dramatic increases
in the years immediately before or after Proposition 8's passage
that would lead one to believe that Proposition 8 in and of itself
influenced new prison admissions. The empirical research that
would isolate Proposition 8's impact and validate the courthouse
perception is yet to be done.323

323. See McCoy and Tillman, Controlling Felony Plea Bargainingin California,supra note
32, at 42-50. The authors attempted to analyze the data in three areas in California-Alameda, San
Diego, and Compton-for the years 1980 through 1984. Their conclusion was that the habitual
offender law (California Penal Code section 667) had little effect on the sentencing of offenders. Id
at 50. However, the scope of their study was limited in time and place.
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FIGURE 3324

NEW ADMITTANCES (NON-PAROLE) To STATE PRISON
Number of
% Change

Years

Admittances

1979

9,874

1980

11,347

15%

1981

13,932

23%

1982

15,932

14%

1983

18,398

15%

1984

17,602

-4%

1985

20,543

17%

1986

23,466

14%

1987

26,535

13%

1988

34,226

30%

1989

39,276

15%

V. PLEA BARGAINING
Throughout the 1970's, and at least the early part of the 1980's,
plea bargaining was associated in the public mind with criminals
getting off with light sentences. District attorney candidates all over
California ran on platforms promising to eliminate plea bargaining.
Serious criticism of plea bargaining often centered around the
possibility that it sent the wrong message to defendants--sentences

324. County and Area Commitments for New Admissionsfrom Court and Parole Violators,
California Department of Corrections, Annual Publication M151-1, For Years 1979 to 1989.
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were the result of tactical manipulation (usually by skilled lawyers)
rather than an assessment of guilt.3"
In 1981, the Joint Legislative Committee for the Revision of the
Penal Code recommended the abolition of plea bargaining.3 26 The
committee cited the disparities in sentencing for the same crimes
that resulted from plea bargaining and argued that plea bargaining
obscured the court's findings regarding the crime of which the
defendant was actually guilty.327
Plea bargaining does distort the sentencing function; but it was
simplistic to say that plea bargaining was the cause of softer
sentences. During the first portion of the 1970's California's prison
population declined; however, from 1976 onward--a period when
plea bargaining was increasing and jury trials decreasing--state28
prison sentences and state prison populations rapidly increased.
It is more accurate to say that plea bargain outcomes reflected the
prevailing norms of the courthouse culture, a sense by prosecutors,
judges, and defenders as to what an appropriate disposition was in
individual cases.
Nor were prosecutors adverse to plea bargaining; they engaged
in it largely as a way of maintaining some control over their
astronomical workloads. Prosecutors understood all too well that it
was impossible to try every case, and that bans on plea bargaining
meant huge backlogs, case delays and deferred punishment,
especially for those defendants out of custody. Most district
attorneys expressed little enthusiasm for the provisions in
Proposition 8 restricting plea bargaining,329 believing that it was

325. See McCoy and Tillman, Controlling Felony Plea Bargainingin California,supra, note
32, at 42. See also, Bradbury, Plea Bargaining: The CarnivalComes to the Courthouse, 4 C.D.A.A.
PROSECUToR'S BRIEF, No. 5, at 5 (March-April 1979).
326. The California Legislature, Plea Bargaining,Final Report of the Joint Committee for the
Reform of the Penal Code at 181-83 (October 1980) (copy on file at Paciflc Law Journal).
327. Id at 181-90.
328. California Department of Corrections, CaliforniaPrisonersand Civil Narcotic Addicts,
1981 and 1982 at 4, 15 (1985) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
329. There was, in fact, very little mention of the plea bargain bar in the literature supporting
Proposition 8 before the election. The few references to plea bargaining came not from prosecutors,
but from the Assembly Republicans. See Analysis ofProposition8, supra note 12, at 37. See also
Kopp, The Realitiesof Victim's Bill of Rights, San Francisco Recorder, May 26, 1982, at 1, col. 2,
9, col. 6 (comments by Supervisor Quentin Kopp of San Francisco).
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added to the initiative more for its political appeal than to assist
district attorneys.
Proposition 8's plea bargaining section prohibited plea
bargaining where the indictment or information charges any serious
felony33 or drunk driving, except in three exceptional
situations. 31 In one of the rare instances of clarity in Proposition
8, the definition of plea bargaining was explicitly stated:
[A]ny bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal
defendant, or his or her counsel, and a prosecuting attorney, or judge,
whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in
exchange for any promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or
consideration by the prosecuting attorney or judge relating to any charge
32
against the defendant or to the sentencing of the defendant.

There were problems, however, with other parts of section
1192.7. First, because section 1192.7(a) speaks in terms of
indictments and informations, the charging documents for superior
court cases, the wording of the section would restrict plea
bargaining in serious felony and drunk driving cases only in the
superior court.333 The difficulty with this is that felony charges
originate in the municipal court by the filing of a complaint.
Therefore, under the wording of section 1192.7(a), plea bargaining
could be conducted in the municipal court. Whether this distinction
was created intentionally is unknown.
Additionally, although the restriction on plea bargaining as
written applied in drunk driving cases, it reached only a small
fraction of these cases because section 1192.7(a) required an
34
information or indictment for the restriction to take affect.
Most drunk driving cases are charged as misdemeanors with

330.

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (enacted by Proposition 8) (definition of serious

felony).
331. See infra note 333-339 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions to CAL PENAL
CODE § 1192.7).
332. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(b) (enacted by Proposition 8).
333. Id. § 1192.7(a) (enacted by Proposition 8).
334. 1&.
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complaints, not with informations or indictments, as the charging
document.
Finally, Proposition 8 set forth three exceptions to the plea
bargaining restriction which were narrow to the point of seeming
ludicrous: (1) There is an insufficient basis to prove the
prosecutor's case; (2) testimony of a material witness cannot be
obtained; or (3) a reduction or dismissal would not result in a
substantial change in the sentence ultimately imposed.335 If there
is, in fact, an insufficient basis to prove the prosecutor's case, the
prosecutor has no business bringing it to trial, and in most
situations is under an ethical obligation to dismiss. 33 6 Conversely,
a defense attorney does a disservice to his client if he allows the
client to plead to an insupportable case.3 7 In terms of the
material witnesses exception, the absence of most material
witnesses usually means that the prosecutor cannot prove the case.
If the material witness is indispensable and cannot be obtained, the
defendant has little incentive to plea. Finally, the exception where
reduction or dismissal would not result in a substantial change of
sentence allows the defendant to obtain a dismissal of related
charges where conviction would result in concurrent sentences.
Other than that, the exception applies to few cases. If there is no
substantial reduction in time offered, there is no reason to plea
bargain.
While the defenders of Proposition 8 claimed that these
exceptions merely reflected the present standards in most
prosecutor's offices, nothing could have been further from truth.
Prosecutors often dismissed and reduced plea-bargained cases that

335. It.
336. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d. ed.), Standard
3-3.9(a) (1986) (stating that "[a] prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted or permit the
continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of admissible evidence to support a
conviction").
337. Id, Commentary to Standard 4-6.1 (stating that "[i]n all circumstances, defense counsel
should challenge the government's case if there is a genuine doubt that the prosecution can carry its
burden of proof").
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they could have proven at trial. 38 As part of the plea bargain,
they recommended sentences for defendants who would have
received more stringent sentences after a trial.3 39 For their part,
defense attorneys did not plead their clients only to redundant or
insupportable chargesY
Under standard plea bargaining
practices, both sides give up something important.34 '
After Proposition 8's enactment, state prosecutors reacted to the
restrictions imposed on plea bargaining in various ways. Some
prosecutors followed section 1192.7 literally and did most of their
serious felony plea bargaining in the municipal court.3 4 2 Other
prosecutors went so far as to carry out the restrictions in both the
municipal and superior courts, viewing the information or
indictment precondition in section 1192.7 as a drafter's error.343
This approach resulted in large backlogs.344 Still other
prosecutors, such as the San Francisco District Attorney, went
about their business as usual, citing one or the other exception,
whether or not the exception was warranted.345
On the whole, the existence of the restrictions have made
prosecutors cautious about the manner in which plea bargains in
felony cases are taken, and it has discouraged many judges from
involvement in the negotiating process. There is some evidence that

338. See CaliforniaLegislature, Plea Bargaining,supra note 326, at 64-94, Tables XXPVXXXVI (commencing after 113), & 182-84 (discussing the process of reducing and dismissing
charges, as well as the reasons for same).
339. Id at 61-64 (quoting a defense attorney, who stated: "Trial is the greatest risk.., if you
lose you got a worse disposition"). Id. at 61.
340. Id. at 56-64.
341. Id.
342. See Analysis of Proposition8, supra note 12, at 38; Letter from Hon. Quentin Kopp to
the San Francisco Bay Guardian (Feb. 10, 1982) (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
343. San Mateo County is a case in point. Telephone interview with Jack M. Inerney, Director,
Private Defender Program of San Mateo (October 29, 1991) (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal).
344. Cox, Prop. 8 IncreasesCourt Congestion,D.A. Study Shows, L.A. Daily J.,
Dec. 20, 1982,
at 1, col. 5; Telephone interview with Carl Holmes, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Orange County
(October 28, 1991) (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal).
345. Ventura and Orange County District Attorneys also took this approach. Telephone
interview with Kenneth Clayman, Ventura Public Defender (October 28, 1991) (notes on file at
Pacific Law Journal).Telephone interview with Carl Holmes, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Orange
County (October 28,1991) (notes on file at Pacific LawJoaurnal).See Memo from Michael Bradbury
of the Ventura County District Attorney to various county and bar officials (January 3, 1983) (copy
on file at Pacific Law Journal).
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Proposition 8's restriction on plea bargaining stimulated the use of
the felony case settlement in the municipal court.34 6 Under this
arrangement, a defendant enters a felony plea of guilty in the
municipal court pursuant to a plea bargain and the preliminary
hearing is dispensed with. By 1982 these settlements had gained
considerable popularity because they speeded dispositions and
eliminated time-consuming evidentiary hearings.
With Proposition 8 in effect, many prosecutors began to insist
that defendants in serious felony cases take their offers of a deal
before the preliminary hearing, threatening to withdraw the offer if
the defendant did not. Many defendants, faced with the
uncertainties of trial and sentencing, did exactly that. Soon
prosecutors were extending the "take or leave it" policy to
felonies not listed in Proposition 8.
In Figure 4, the trend of increased felony settlement in the
municipal court is shown. Prior to Proposition 8, from 1976 to
1982, the number of certified felony pleas in the municipal court
rose each year. After Proposition 8, from 1982 to 1984, there is a
marked increase. This, undoubtedly, is an imperfect measure of
Proposition 8's impact, because included in these numbers are both
serious and non-serious felonies. 47 But Figure 4 suggests
that
48
Proposition 8 gave impetus to this pre-existing trend.1

346. San Francisco and Solano counties are cases in point. Interviews with Peter G. Keane,
Chief Attorney, San Francisco Public Defender (October 28, 1991) and Marteen J. Miller, Public
Defender, Solano County (October 29, 1991) (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal).
347. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West Supp. 1992) (definition of serious felony).
348. See McCoy & Tillman, supra note 32, at 65.
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FIGURE 4349
PERCENTAGE OF CERTIFIED PLEAS OF FELONY SENTENCES

Year

T

Percentage

Percent Change

1976-77

14.8

1977-78

15.8

+6

1978-79

19.5

+3.7

1979-80

21.6

+2.1

1980-81

24.3

+2.7

1981-82

27

+2.7

1982-83

33.9

+6.9

1983-84

40

+6.1

1984-85

41.8

+1.8

1985-86

44.6

+2.8

1986-87

44.3

-.3

1987-88

46.7

+2.4

1988-89

50.3

+3.6

1989-90

51.8

+1.5

To the extent Proposition 8 strengthened the tendency toward
case settlement in the municipal court, it had an important effect on
the practice of criminal defense. The plea of guilty in municipal
court usually occurs within a few weeks of arrest. As such, there
is insufficient time for defense counsel to confer with the client.
The guilty plea is undertaken without the advantage of the defense
having seen prosecution witnesses face questioning in a courtroom.
It may be done without the time required for proper investigation,

349.

Judicial Council Annual Reports, 1976-1977 to 1989-1990. Figures computed by author.
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and it may preclude having full discovery from the
prosecution. 5 ° The net effect of this practice is a serious erosion
of the quality of defense representation. In certain cases it
endangers the innocent.
Finally, whatever else it did, Proposition 8 did not reduce plea
bargaining. In an era where municipalities are governed by the
fiscal reality of another momentous initiative, Proposition 13,351
the property tax limitation initiative, there are too few resources-too few prosecutors, judges and public defenders, as well as too
little court space--to do anything but bargain away enormous
portions of the workload. The serious felony case, which
commands a disproportionate share of those resources, is no
exception.
VI. CONCLUSION AND COMMENTARY

Proposition 8 was a clumsy and poorly-drafted document. As
such, it engendered enormous litigation to define its purpose and
it often missed its mark. After a decade, practitioners continue to
struggle with the meaning of its text.
For all its inadequacies, Proposition 8 did succeed in bringing
an end to the liberal jurisprudence in California's criminal law.
Until that time, California courts had demonstrated a consistent
concern for the rights of the accused. The legislature, for the most
part, had not intervened. Only in the last few years before
Proposition 8 did the legislature attempt to reverse any of the
Supreme Court of California's decisions. Even then, major attempts
to change existing precedent, such a Senate Constitutional
Amendment 7 (1981)352 which would have federalized search and
seizure and confession standards, stalled in committee.

350. The discovery process continues throughout the life of the case, including through the trial
itself. A plea before a preliminary hearing often precludes the defense from getting further discovery.
351. Tax Limitation, Initiative Measure Proposition 13 (approved June 6, 1978) (codified at
CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, §§ 1-6).
352. Senate Constitutional Amendment 7, introduced by Sen. Presley in the 1981 Legislative
Session. It was never passed out of the Legislature for submission to the electorate.
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Proposition 8 broke the ground for change. Although it would
take much time and litigation, Proposition 8 would accomplish
what conservatives had failed to do in the legislature. Following
Proposition 8 would be a strong and steady stream of legislation
which consistently "upped the ante" on the accused.
For the defense attorney, change would eventually be
noticeable. With fewer searches and confessions being suppressed
and with prior convictions being admitted, there are fewer winnable
cases. And whatever the empirical evidence shows, every felony
attorney knows a defendant's five-year-old prior conviction makes
the risk of trial greater and, often, unacceptable.
The proponents of Proposition 8 pledged it would make
California safer for law-abiding citizens. After a decade, the
unabated crime rate defies this prediction. As gangs freely roam
our cities and drugs are easily sold to our young, Californians are
beginning to see the limited relevance of criminal law and
procedure to the prevention of crime.
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